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Abstract 
Do all actors have equal opportunities to participate in multi-level governance arrangements? 
As the first EU macro-regional strategy, the EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region (EUSBSR) 
is an interesting and important case for studying actors’ participation opportunities in multi-
level governance arrangements. This thesis undertakes to identify factors that are favourable 
for an actor’s opportunity to participate, by studying the case of the EUSBSR. The findings 
serve to open up discussions concerning equal opportunities to participate, which is 
fundamental for legitimacy. It is concluded that there is a strong overrepresentation of 
national governmental actors, and it is their strong position in society that seems to be the 
favourable factor for their opportunity to participate. Furthermore, experience, in addition to 
expertise, also appears to be a favourable factor. Yet, it seems crucial that an actor perceives 
itself as affected, and especially by the issue, if it is to participate at all. Further research 
concerning the effect of affectedness, as well as concerning the concept of expertise, is 
therefore proposed.   
Keywords: macro-regional strategies, participation, multi-level governance, legitimacy, 
Baltic Sea region, affectedness 
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1. Introduction 
Traditional democratic ideals are challenged in today’s globalised society where governance 
structures have become more and more complex. Actors from multiple levels and multiple 
sectors are involved, in order to attain effective governance of common issues that can no 
longer be solved by within the nation state. Multi-level governance (MLG) is one concept 
which embraces this phenomenon. One of the democratic challenges concerns ensuring that 
all actors have reasonable equal opportunities to participate, and having their interests 
represented. Upholding these fundamental democratic principles is necessary for the 
legitimacy of the governance of those arrangements. 
One case which corresponds with this notion of complex forms of governance is the EU 
Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region (EUSBSR). The EUSBSR is the first EU macro-regional 
strategy and the aim of the strategy is to save the sea, connect the region and increase 
prosperity (European Commission, 2012a). The initiative is a reaction to the fact that the eight 
EU member states in the region face several common challenges as well as opportunities. The 
conviction has been that these challenges and opportunities can be met by better coordination, 
and by more efficient use of resources and networks that already exist in the region (European 
Commission, 2012b).  
The strategy is therefore built on the three no’s principle: no new funding, no new legislation, 
and no new institutions. It has also been emphasised that extensive stakeholder participation is 
crucial for the success of the EUSBSR, and hence MLG has been integrated in its structures 
(Council of the European Union, 2011). Broad participation is requested both for the 
development of the strategy and for its implementation through the various flagship projects 
in the EUSBSR Action Plan (European Commission, 2012a). 
Responsibilities and tasks for the strategy’s coordination and development have thus been 
divided upon a great number of actors. Worries have been raised concerning the feasibility of 
implementing the strategy given its complex, or lacking, structures (Bengtsson, 2009; 
Schymik & Krumrey, 2009), as well as concerning the actual involvement of a multitude of 
actors (Stocchiero, 2010). In addition, the Council has requested improvements concerning 
visibility; clarification and strengthening of roles; and development of evaluation criteria 
(Council of the European Union, 2011).  
The Commission has had the overall coordination responsibility since the beginning, and 
responsibilities, roles, and tasks have emerged gradually (European Commission, 2012a). 
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Among the key implementing stakeholders are the flagship project leaders (FPL) (Council of 
the European Union, 2011). It is not fixed who can be an FPL, and the criteria are quite 
general. In essence, it is open for all types of actors to become a FPL. Giving a precise answer 
to who is a stakeholder, and who is implementing the EUSBSR, is in principle impossible to 
do. This raises further questions concerning the governance of the EUSBSR. Who are the 
participants of the EUSBSR? Who are the FPLs, and what type of actors do they represent? 
Do these actors have anything in common? Clarifying these uncertainties is crucial for the 
legitimacy of the EUSBSR, and this is where this thesis departs.    
This thesis approaches the EUSBSR as a MLG arrangement from a legitimacy perspective. In 
order to answer the questions above, theories and previous research concerning participation 
opportunities are applied to the most visible and concrete component of the EUSBSR – the 
Action Plan and its flagship projects. The purpose is to gain an understanding of what factors 
that seems to be favourable for an actor’s participation in the EUSBSR, in order to open up a 
discussion regarding how legitimate the EUSBSR is from a normative perspective. 
1.2 Disposition 
This thesis has the following structure. First, the research question and aim of the study is laid 
out, and a background to the EUSBSR is given. Thereafter, the theoretical framework follows, 
including both a discussion concerning legitimacy and MLG, as well as previous research 
concerning actors’ participation opportunities. In the third chapter, research design, case study 
method, and other methodological considerations are addressed. Next, concepts derived from 
previous research forms the basis for the analytical framework. In the fifth chapter, empirical 
findings are presented in table form, and are thereafter analysed. The thesis concludes by 
answering the research question, and by making recommendations for further research.    
1.3 Research aim and research question  
This thesis aims at contributing to the discussion concerning normative legitimacy of MLG 
arrangements. It undertakes to identify factors that are favourable for an actor’s opportunity to 
participate, by studying the case of the EUSBSR. The finding serves to open up discussions 
concerning equal opportunities to participate.  
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It makes a theoretical contribution by adding to and developing existing theories of 
participation opportunities. It also fills an empirical gap concerning research on the EUSBSR 
and EU macro-regional strategies.  
The following main research question is posed: 
What factors seem to favour an actor’s opportunity to participate in the EU Strategy for the 
Baltic Sea Region?  
The main research question is answered through five sub-questions. 
- Who are the actors participating in the EUSBSR?  
- What resources do the participating actors have?  
- What position in society do the participating actors have? 
- What access to information and channels of influence do the participating actors 
have? 
- How affected are the participating actors by the EUSBSR as a transnational 
cooperation project in the Baltic Region, and/or by the issue of the Priority Area in 
question? 
The first sub-question is answered in by the identification of flagship project leaders (FPL) 
presented in appendix 2, as well as by the categorisation of actor type and nationality in 
chapter 5.1. The remaining sub-questions are answered by the empirical analysis of eight 
FPLs, which is presented in appendix 3, summarised in chapter 5.1, and discussed in chapter 
5.2. 
This thesis does not intend to answer whether the governance structures of EUSBSR are 
normatively legitimate or not. The aim is to open up for a discussion concerning the 
legitimacy of MLG arrangements in general, and the EUSBSR in specific. Answering the 
research question will enable making conclusions concerning what factors that might be 
favourable for an actor to participate in the EUSBSR. It can make no conclusions regarding 
those actors who are not participating. However, by having a more thorough understanding of 
the participants, it will be possible to discuss whether there are actors who are excluded 
because they do not have the same capabilities, and to do further research on this matter. Not 
until then can conclusions be made regarding the legitimacy of the EUSBSR. This thesis 
makes valuable contribution by opening up for discussions regarding if all actors have equal 
opportunities to participate. 
8 
 
 
1.4 Background to the EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region 
By the adoption of the EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region (EUSBSR) during the Swedish 
EU Presidency 2009, the concept of macro regional strategies was introduced into EU policy. 
Its members include Sweden, Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Germany and 
Denmark. The EUBSR was followed by the Danube strategy in 2011, which to a large extent 
builds in the same model as the EUSBSR (European Commission, 2011). The concept of 
macro-regional strategies has not yet been clearly defined, but the Commission will present a 
report concerning the value added of the macro-region approach by June 2013 (European 
Commission, 2011). However, the reactions have been positive both in the Commission’s 
progress report, and in the Council’s Conclusions (European Commission, 2011; Council of 
the European Union, 2011).  
The EUSBSR initiative was taken as it was realised that the EU member states in the Baltic 
Sea region were facing common challenges as well as opportunities (Bengtsson, 2009). Four 
areas for cooperation were identified: sustainable environment, prosperity, attractiveness and 
accessibility, and safety and security (European Commission, 2012b). These four pillars will 
be changed to the three objectives “save the sea, connect the region and increase prosperity” 
(Interact, 2012a).  
There is a long and well established tradition of cooperation in the Baltic Sea region. 
However, the activities of the various cooperation institutions in the region were not 
coordinated (Bengtsson, 2009). A distinctive feature of the EUSBSR is the so called three no 
principle: no new funding, no new legislation, and no new institutions. The idea was that there 
are enough resources and institutions within the Baltic Sea region; the key is to use those 
more efficiently by better coordination of activities (European Commission, 2009). 
Governance structure – a multi-level governance arrangement 
The EUSBSR can be seen as a MLG arrangement and it is constantly emphasised in the 
EUSBSR documents that MLG is essential for having a successful implementation (Council 
of the European Union, 2011). It was drafted after an extensive public consultation, and there 
are several stakeholder events as well as an annual conference. The aim is to involve 
stakeholder from all levels and all sectors, and institutions such as HELCOM, the Baltic 
Development Forum and the Council for the Baltic Sea States are mentioned as being 
important (European Commission, 2011). Concerns have been raised, however,  regarding the 
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feasibility of coordinating a strategy without a specific institution, or extra funding 
(Bengtsson, 2009). It has become apparent that there is a need to clarify the organisation 
structures (Council of the European Union, 2011; European Commission, 2011) and the roles 
of actors have emerged gradually. In March 2012, the Commission presented a new 
communication after a request from the Council where progress has been made regarding 
specification of roles and responsibilities, as well as of targets (European Commission, 
2012a). Visibility and communication is another problem which is addressed in the 
communication. Recently, as a response to this, a new web page
1
 was created exclusively for 
the EUSBSR, along with other measures to increase communication. 
The Action Plan and the flagship projects 
The most important document of the EUSBSR might be its Action Plan which is divided into 
15 priority areas, each lead by a Priority Area Coordinator (PAC) appointed by the member 
state. The Action Plan includes more than 80 flagship projects, and various strategic and 
horizontal actions (European Commission, 2011, 2012b). The flagship projects are central for 
the implementation of the strategy. The Action Plan is regularly updated and revised 
(European Commission, 2012b), and new flagship projects are selected and added. The 
criteria for being a flagship project is that it contributes to the objective of the EUSBSR  and 
the implementation of the priority areas; that it has a clear budget and timeframe; that it has 
project leadership; and that there is cooperation among the leaders (Interact, 2012b). 
The function of the flagship projects has been specified, but the selection process of flagship 
projects is still unclear. After consulting contact persons for the EUSBSR, it could be 
understood that a project, or a project idea, that wants to become a flagship project presents 
itself to the relevant PAC. If the PAC considers the project as suitable according to the criteria 
above, it recommends it to the Commission. The Commission in its turn considers the 
proposal and makes recommendations to the High Level Group, constituted by representatives 
of the 27 EU member states. It is then decide, by the Commission and the High Level Group 
in consultation with each other, if the project is to become a flagship in the Action Plan
2
. The 
latest revision of the Action Plan was made in December 2010, and was updated in January 
2012. The Action Plan is currently going through a major review which is expected to be 
finished by the end of 2012 (Interact, 2012a). It is also indicated that support for macro-
regional strategies will be included in the 2014-2020 financial framework, and it is 
                                                 
1
 www.balticsea-region-strategy.eu/  
2
 Based on a non-official document from obtained via European Commission’s EUSBSR information contact. 
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encouraged that member states prioritise the EUSBSR’s objectives (European Commission, 
2012a). 
2. Theoretical framework and previous research 
The theoretical framework is based on previous research and is divided into two parts. The 
aim of the first part is to define the concept of legitimacy within the context of multi-level 
governance (MLG), and explain how it is related to democracy, and the principle of equal 
opportunities. The criteria for legitimacy of MLG arrangements are also defined within this 
section. The aim of the second part is to develop an understanding for what conditions that 
determine an actor’s opportunity to participate. 
2.1 Definitions of legitimacy in multi-level governance   
In order to enable assessing legitimacy, it is necessary to clearly define from which 
perspective legitimacy is approached. Furthermore, since the EUSBSR is seen as a MLG 
arrangement, it is necessary to place the issue of legitimacy within the context of MLG. 
MLG is here used as a conceptual devise to capture and describe the governance structures of 
the EUSBSR and not as a theory (Zürn, Wälti, & Enderlein, 2010). There are several different 
conceptualizations within the literature of what MLG is or is not (Peters & Pierre, 2004), or 
what analytical value the concept has (Bache & Flinders, 2004; Piattoni, 2010). A general and 
fundamental assumption made, is that MLG arrangements are characterised by the 
involvement of multiple actors from multiple levels, and by fluid or flexible orders of 
governance (Marks & Hooghe, 2004; Piattoni, 2010; Zürn et al., 2010). In this thesis, MLG 
refers to arrangements which share those characteristics. Theories such as ‘network 
governance’ and ‘new modes of governance’ also discuss governance arrangements and do, to 
a larger or lesser extent, fit the MLG definition above. Piattoni (2010) argue that those 
theoretical understandings are not equivalent to MLG, which she considers to be more 
encompassing and cover the dynamics more fully. However, this thesis regards those strands 
within the governance literature as relevant, in cases where they can be considered to overlap 
with MLG, and on the premises that it shares the basic MLG assumption of multi-actor and 
multi-level involvement.    
Normative legitimacy  
Legitimacy can be conceptualised in several different ways. This thesis is interested in, and 
limited to, the normative dimension of legitimacy, which has as its issue whether “regulations, 
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institutions, authorities and their actions are justifiable to those affected by them, and 
particularly towards those required to uphold them.” (Føllesdal, 2011:86). By other words, in 
this thesis, the issue of legitimacy concerns whether the EUSBSR can be justified by the 
affected actors.   
Føllesdal (2011:86) distinguish normative legitimacy from legal and social dimensions of 
legitimacy. These two perspectives of legitimacy would, if applied in this thesis, assess 
whether the governance of the EUSBSR is legally justifiable or whether there is a general 
compliance with the governance of the EUSBSR. Normative legitimacy is, according to 
Føllesdal (2011), more demanding than the other two dimensions. The decisions in a 
dictatorship can be legitimate according to the legal system of the regime, and a decision can 
be socially legitimate as long as the citizens comply, irrelevant of whether they are correctly 
informed. However, neither of these two cases would be regarded as legitimate from a 
normative perspective (Føllesdal, 2011).  
Legitimacy and multi-level governance  
Within the literature on MLG, there is a debate concerning what particular norms that should 
be applied when assessing MLG arrangements. A majority of the research which assess the 
legitimacy of MLG arrangements focus specifically on the EU (Føllesdal, 2011; Lord & 
Beetham, 2001; Piattoni, 2010; Scharpf, 2009), and are made as contributions to the wider 
debate on the legitimacy deficit, or democratic deficit, of the EU.  Even if this thesis differs 
from those studies, in the respect that it studies a specific MLG arrangement within the EU 
and not the EU per se, the general discussions on legitimacy and MLG is mostly relevant and 
applicable to this thesis. 
MLG arrangements are often criticised for the weak opportunity of citizen’s to participate, 
which is also known as the input side of legitimacy. When this criticism is directed to the EU 
as a MLG polity it concerns, more or less, “the lack of a common public space, the lack of 
EU-wide political debates, party competition, and political accountability” (Scharpf, 
2009:178). However, on the other side of the debate, one can also find the argument that the 
EU, as an MLG polity, is more open towards participation (Piattoni, 2010:200).  
Various researchers argue that MLG arrangements are different from national governments, 
and that therefore,  the legitimacy of MLG arrangements should be evaluated in another 
manner (Piattoni, 2010:187). Issues regarding legitimacy in MLG arrangements, such as the 
EU, have given rise to suggestions of alternative sources of legitimacy for MLG and related 
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forms of governance. Among the positive views on  multi levelled forms of governance, one 
finds claims of increased participation and stakeholder inclusion (Papadopoulos, 2010), i.e. 
referring to input legitimacy. This is also reflected within the literature on the EU’s 
legitimacy. One way to legitimise MLG arrangements is by claiming that they are more 
effective and have a greater problem-solving capacity, than traditional forms of governing 
(Peters & Pierre, 2004), i.e. referring to output legitimacy.  
Thus, there are different ways to argue why MLG arrangements are, or are not, legitimate. 
This thesis shares the theoretical perspective of those scholars arguing that it is not a question 
of abandoning traditional notions of legitimacy altogether, but that it rather is a question of 
adopting it to the new political reality. Piattoni (2010) takes classical EU governance criteria 
as benchmarks for evaluating the legitimacy of MLG arrangements. By referring to those 
theories, she argue that the legitimacy of MLG is based on its input, output and contribution 
to democracy (Piattoni, 2010:190-191). Democracy is seen as being the most important of 
those since it is consist of both input and output legitimacy.  
The same reasoning is made by Lord & Beetham (2001) who argue that we cannot accept less 
legitimate standards for MLG arrangements, such as the EU, than from liberal democratic 
states. However, they acknowledge that “it does not follow that the same methods of 
legitimation need be used” (Lord & Beetham, 2001:449). They conclude that what it 
essentially means for a state, as well as for the EU, to be legitimate that it is democratic (Lord 
& Beetham, 2001:445-446). 
It therefore seems fair to say, that democracy is a necessary criterion for a political 
arrangement to be normatively legitimate (Piattoni, 2010:228-229), regardless if it is a MLG 
arrangement or a national government. Consequently, in order for the EUSBSR to be 
legitimate it must be democratic. This brings us to the question of what it means for 
governance to be democratic. 
As the criteria for legitimacy can therefore be derived from the democratic principles, the next 
question to address is what it means for governance to be democratic.  
Democracy, representation and equal opportunities to participate 
Classic democratic theory is based on the ideal of a representative political system, which 
assumes equal opportunity to participate. Dahl (1999) puts substantial focus on the principle 
of equality, in his widely known writings on democracy. 
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In traditional state-centric perspectives, the principle of equal opportunity to participate refers 
to the individual citizen’s participation in the political system, e.g. through voting (Dahl, 
1999). This state-centric perspective is not applicable to the way that society is governed 
today. Therefore, there is a need for a reformulation of the state-centric conception of 
democracy, without abandoning its basic principles (Sørensen, 2002).  
One aspect, where MLG differ from state-centric democratic ideals, is in its perspective on 
participation. In a democratic state, citizens participate by voting, and they are represented by 
political parties. In MLG arrangements, however, the participants are actors of various kinds, 
and who are representing interests that might be territorial as well as functional. This is 
clearly the case of the EUSBSR, where various kinds of actors, who has great difference in 
interests as well as jurisdictions, are involved (Marks & Hooghe, 2004:15-22). A regional 
council, a state agency, and an environmental interest organisation are fundamentally 
different, even if it at the same time, according to Piattoni (2010:13), is a tendency to greater 
assimilation between actors representing territorial and functional interests. What can be seen 
is a political arena where the principal agents are actors, rather than political parties or 
citizens. 
Actor participation, rather than citizen voting, is not necessarily a threat towards the principle 
of equal representation, which builds on equal opportunities to participate, according to the 
participatory democratic ideal (Saurugger, 2008:1276). The criteria is that “equal access for 
all groups regardless of their financial, social and societal resources” is provided (Saurugger, 
2008:1283). Uhrwing (2001) applies the same kind of reasoning in her study of interest 
organisation, and where she argues that a certain representativeness should be among interest 
organisations as well.  
Sørensen (2002) discuss the challenges that new, multi-actor, forms of governance pose to 
democratic representation and claims that “[d]ue to the weakened position of the nation-state, 
it becomes increasingly unclear between whom political influence should be equally divided” 
(Sørensen, 2002:713). Clearly, a basic criteria for an actor to have equal opportunity to 
participate, is that it actually has an opportunity to participate in the first place. A common 
answer to the question of who should be included in multi-level forms of governance is that 
those who are affected by a decision should have the right to participate (Piattoni, 2010; 
Smismans, 2008; Sørensen, 2002). 
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According to Sørensen (2002), it is not formally established who is affected, and it is left open 
to the actor to decide whether it wants to participate or not. However, many authors fail to 
give any further explanation concerning who is to be considered as affected by a decision. It is 
problematic to define inclusion by such a loose concept as affectedness, given that it is a 
fundamental condition for participation.  
For the EUSBSR it is difficult, if not impossible, to identify who the affected actors are, even 
if there are some geographical limitations. Since it is difficult to draw exact lines of who is 
involved and not, it is up to the actor to claim its affectedness. It is therefore appropriate to 
speak of subjective affectedness, as a way to decide who is included and who is excluded 
(Karlsson Schaffer, 2012). However, an actor who do not perceive itself as affected could 
then be excluded because of its own perception (Piattoni, 2010) . 
In conclusion, what can be demanded from a MLG arrangement to be democratic is that all 
actors have equal opportunity to participate. It is also essential that all actors actually affected 
by the policy perceive themselves as affected. 
2.2. How the concepts are related 
It is appropriate to further elaborate how the different concepts are related. Democracy is a 
basic precondition for an initiative like the EUSBSR to be normatively legitimate. The 
EUSBSR has MLG structures, which is a reflection of a European, as well as global, 
development of increasingly complex structures of governance. This development challenges 
the representative democratic ideal’s principles of one person one vote, and equal opportunity 
to participate. It thus creates the need for reformulation of traditional democratic ideals, and 
consequently of legitimacy as well. The participants are actors of various kinds, whose 
inclusion and right to participate, is dependent on their affectedness. Hence, what is necessary 
for the EUSBSR, or any MLG arrangement, to be legitimate, is that all affected actors have 
equal opportunities to participate. However, “problems arise because it cannot be guaranteed 
that a system of governance represents all affected parties” (Christiansen, Føllesdal, & 
Piattoni, 2003:15) This is, in its turn, a legitimacy problem in so far that some affected parties 
are excluded, or that all affected parties do not have equal opportunities to participate. In the 
following section, it will be elaborated on why it might be the case that all affected parties are 
not represented. This is done by developing an understanding of what factors that are 
favourable to an actor’s opportunity to participate, as well as of what factors that determines 
an actor’s affectedness.  
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2.3 Opportunities to participate 
In the previous section, it was argued that the democratic principle of equal opportunities to 
participate must be met, in order for MLG arrangements, such as the EUSBSR, to be 
legitimate. Furthermore, in MLG arrangements, it is the affected actors, and not the national 
citizens, that the principle of equal opportunities applies to.  The thesis will now go further 
into the theoretical discussions on what factors that favour an actor the opportunity to 
participate, in order to enable evaluating the legitimacy of the EUSBSR.  
Within the literature, there is a lack of research assessing the legitimacy of MLG 
arrangements through analysing the equality between actors participating in MLG 
arrangements. The focus is rather on whether MLG actually changes the power structures and 
whether the actors who have access to the political system have any real influence (Jeffery, 
2000). Furthermore, there is, to the author’s knowledge, no analytical framework that can be 
applied to encompass all actors, regardless of level or sector. The research is mainly focusing 
either on participation of interest groups, or on participation of sub-national authorities. Since 
diversity of stakeholders is in the very core of MLG arrangements, it is reasonable, and 
valuable, to design an analytical framework that includes and acknowledge those differences.  
Another reason for making a uniform analysis encompassing all actor types, is that actors of 
different jurisdictions are becoming more similar, i.e. local governments are approaching 
interest organisations vice versa (Piattoni, 2010:13). This makes it even more difficult to 
separate and analyse actors according to independent categories.  
This thesis will therefore combine different theoretical perspectives on actor participation in 
order to obtain a fuller understanding of the conditions of participation in MLG arrangements. 
The aim is to identify concepts in those theories that can be operationalized and applied to all 
actors included in the analysis. Some authors are not explicitly referring to one of the 
theoretical perspectives presented in this subchapter, or focusing exclusively on one of them. 
Still, based on the arguments and main points presented in previous research and theory, a 
rough categorization has been made, in order to distinguish between basic theoretical 
perspectives. The question of what it means for an actor to be affected is also addressed. 
Interest organisations: traces of pluralism and corporatism 
When it comes to political participation of interest organisations, the most common theories 
are pluralism and corporatism. The pluralistic claim is that the political system does not 
favour any actor over another, and that there is a competition among actors (Eising, 
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2008:1169) Whether or not an actor can participate in depends on its resources (Uhrwing, 
2001:25). Corporatism, on the other hand, claim that the political system is favouring certain 
actors (Falkner, 2000:95), such as producer organisations, or those who are especially 
dominant in their field (Uhrwing, 2001:33). There is a preferential relation between the 
stakeholder and the decision-maker.  
Uhrwing (2001) has analysed interest organisations possibility to access political processes in 
the case of Swedish environmental policy-making. The theories used are corporatism, 
pluralism, and the Political Process Approach. Her conclusion is that resources do matter, and 
adds that expertise is one of the most valuable resources. Uhrwing (2001) acknowledged that 
expertise can be seen as dependent on economic resources 
Greer, da Fonseca, & Adolph (2008) assess whether there is a bias in interest representation in 
the EU. Their conclusion is that the EU is favouring those who are energetic and well 
financed, and that evidence from the health sector shows that this furthermore has created a 
national bias where post-communist and Mediterranean interest groups are underrepresented, 
due to resource inequalities. Hence, Greer, da Fonseca, & Adolph (2008) are leaning towards 
the pluralist explanation where it is the capabilities and resources of an actor that matters. 
Coen (2007) has made an extensive review of factors that have been found to affect an 
interest organisations participation in EU policy. If one intends to categorise those factors, 
they could be considered to be of corporatist, as well as pluralist natures. Firstly, business 
associations are overrepresented in the consultation process. However, it is not necessarily the 
consequence of preferential relationships with the Commission, since it can also be because 
they “have a comparative advantage in terms of organizational capacity, financial resources, 
expertise and information” (Coen, 2007:335). Still, it has been established that there is a trust-
relationship between the Commission and the consulted interest groups, and that it is 
important to create a good reputation. This is, however, not referred to as corporatism, but as 
élite pluralism. Furthermore, interest organisation deploys various strategies to get 
advantageous positions in the EU policy-making and one of those is to take collective action. 
Another view on actor participation is put forward by Smismans (2008) who conclude that the 
new modes of governance  in the EU are favouring participation of national administrations 
rather than stakeholders. Those who are participating are often experts of a more technical 
nature. He also finds that stakeholders are sometimes prevented from taking part, due to lack 
of economic resources and employees, and acknowledge that exclusion from information is a 
17 
 
problem. Even if the EUSBSR is not primarily about technical matters, the findings of 
Smismans (2008) are relevant for understanding that initiatives to increase participation is not 
necessarily leading to increased participation, and that stakeholders do not always have the 
resources needed in order to participate.  
According to the approaches just presented, resources such as budget size, employees, and 
expertise, often matter for an actor’s possibility to participate, or to have an influence, in 
political processes. Furthermore, there might be preferential relationships between the 
stakeholders and the policy-makers. 
Territorial interests: Sub-national mobilisation 
While the theories and research above have mainly focused on interest groups, there is a wide 
range of literature concerning sub-national mobilization, and which discuss the influence of 
sub-national authorities. Sub-national mobilization is interested the role of sub-national 
authorities in EU decision-making, and is part of the MLG literature
3
. Even if several of those 
authors focus on influence, while this thesis is focusing on participation, it is here suggested 
that this literature can be used for identifying factors that are favourable for an actor’s 
opportunity to participate as well.  
Charles Jeffrey (2000) is one of the protagonists within this field. He acknowledges that sub-
national authorities (SNA) differ in various aspects, and hence have different possibilities to 
mobilize and to participate in influence activities. Variations do not just exist between regions 
in different member states, but within member states as well. Constitutional factors are the 
main reasons for an SNA’s influential strength are. In addition to those factors, Jeffrey (200) 
finds that variables such as intergovernmental relations, entrepreneurship and legitimacy are 
important. Entrepreneurship refer to the “administrative adaptation, leadership, and coalition-
building strategies [of the SNA] in response to the challenges posed by European integration” 
(Jeffery, 2000:14). Legitimacy, on the other hand, refers to how well anchored the SNA is 
among the citizens in its territory, and is often connected to regional identity, political 
arrangement and historical rootedness. What he mainly confirms is that there are weak and 
strong regions within Europe.  
Bomberg & Peterson (1998) share Jeffrey’s (2000) conception that SNAs have different 
possibilities to influence EU-decision making. They also agree, that constitutional factors 
                                                 
3
 Sub-national mobilization is here not seen as a full theory of MLG, since the focus is exclusively on sub-
national authorities, and not on other actors which are a part of MLG as the concept is applied in this thesis.  
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matters, but further add that there are other factors that matter as well. Other factors that 
increase an SNA’s opportunity to influence are joining coalitions, having representation in 
Brussels, and cooperating with EU institutions or national governments. Bomberg & Peterson 
(1998) acknowledge that there are both formal and informal channels of influence. Informal 
channels include representation office in Brussels, networks, and coalition building.     
That representation in Brussels is an important part of sub-national mobilization has been 
pointed out by several authors (Liesbet Hooghe & Marks, 1996; Marks, Haesly, & Mbaye, 
2002; Moore, 2008). The phenomena of representation could therefore be seen as an 
indication that access to information and channels of influence seem to be of importance.  
Thus, sub-national mobilization points out that some SNA’s are better equipped for 
participation than others. Moreover, the phenomenon of sub-national mobilization as such 
reflects that information, and channels influence, is regarded as beneficial by the SNA’s. The 
strategies deployed include establishing representation offices, as well as building coalitions.   
Affectedness 
Affectedness cannot be categorised in the same way as the theories presented previously. 
There are several theories which explain citizen’s political participation (Esaiasson & 
Westholm, 2006). However, the actors participating in MLG arrangements are mainly 
institutions or organisations and not citizens. Arguably, a citizen and an institution are too 
different to be equally compared. A clear strand of literature that assesses actors’ affectedness 
has not been found. However,  traces can be found within literature on actor participation and 
MLG (Sørensen, 2002), as well as within literature concerning transnational democracy 
(Karlsson Schaffer, 2012). While the literature presented earlier is focusing on the actual 
participation, affectedness is more connected to the mobilization phase. It is more or less 
irrelevant whether or not an actor actually participates; it is more about if the actor has the 
intention to participate, and what the choice to mobilize or not to mobilize depends on.  
Piattoni (2010), who has written an extensive volume on MLG, conclude that an actor’s 
“failure to mobilize may indicate […] lack of interest, capacity, or belief in opportunity to do 
so” (Piattoni, 2010:92). The lack of capacity clearly relates to the pluralist assumption of 
actors participation opportunities. However, the lack of interest and belief in opportunity to 
mobilize is connected to an actor’s affectedness. Whether or not an actor is interested in 
participating, might be the result of a well-founded decision. However, it might also be the 
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case that how the issue is framed has had an effect of whether or not an actor perceives it as 
being affected.  
Whether an actor believes it has the opportunity is even more clearly connected to 
affectedness. An actor who actually has the opportunity to participate might be excluded due 
to its own perceptions.  Piattoni’s (2010) empirical research further demonstrates that an 
actor’s decision to mobilize is determined by whether there is a “match or mis-match between 
the level at which they believed it was appropriate for them to get mobilized and the level at 
which the issue was addressed” (Piattoni, 2010:178). Hence, an actor needs to believe that it 
is competent enough and has the resources needed, to get mobilized. Therefore, it could be 
assumed that an actor’s choice to participate in the EUSBSR is based on its own subjective 
judgement that it is appropriate and possible for it to do so. As a consequence, actors tend to 
legitimate their participation by referring to that their level is adequate for solving the 
problem (Piattoni, 2010:181).  Piattoni (2012) give as an example, the fact that in 
environmental issue, non-governmental organisations frequently participate since they ‘feel’ 
that they have the adequate competences and knowledge (Piattoni, 2010:178). 
Returning to why affectedness matters for legitimacy, it can be said to do so since these 
conceptions of why an actor perceive it as appropriate or feasible to participate “sometimes 
prevents them from mobilizing at levels at which they could in fact make fundamental 
contributions” (Piattoni, 2010:181). 
Due to the geographical and political scope of the EUSBSR, there are a great number of 
actors that could be regarded as affected, but all those actors will not participate. What is 
crucial, from a legitimacy perspective, is that participation is not restricted just because 
potential actors do not perceive themselves as legitimate actors, or as affected by the 
EUSBSR.   
The question that follows is what an actor, in the case of the EUSBSR, should be affected of. 
It could be Baltic Sea region cooperation, or the issues addressed by the EUSBSR. In this 
thesis, it is argued that both factors are relevant.  
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3. Method 
This thesis follows an embedded single case study design (Yin, 2009:50). The EUSBSR 
serves as a case for multi-level governance (MLG) arrangements, and can be seen as a unique 
case in the sense that it was the first macro-regional strategy, and has quite unique governance 
structures (Yin, 2009:47).  The case study is particularly useful for studying contemporary 
events that are dependent on the context in which they take place, and it is therefore well 
suited for this thesis (Yin, 2009:18). The embedded units of analysis are the leaders of the 
flagship projects listed in the Action Plan. Figure 1 is used in order to illustrate the logic of 
the embedded case study design. 
Figure 1: Embedded single case study 
 
Based on model by Yin (2009:46) 
 
The research includes empirical analyses at two levels. First, an analysis of the general 
features of the leaders of the flagship projects leaders (FPL) is made. It then moves on by 
analysing eight of the FPLs more thoroughly, in order to get a more detailed understanding of 
which factors that seem to be favourable for an actor’s participation opportunities. The 
findings from the analysis of the eight FPLs will be put in relation to all FPLs. The 
generalizability of case studies is sometimes questioned, but as Yin (2009:15) explains, case 
studies are generalizable to theories. The results here should be seen as generalizable for 
participation in the EUSBSR and macro regional strategies, and as theoretically generalizable 
for to multi-level governance. Figure 2 provides an illustration of this thesis’ research design. 
CONTEXT: Transnational multi-level governed 
cooperation/macro-regional strategies 
 Case: the EUSBSR 
Embedded unit of 
analysis 1 
Flagship project leader 1 
Embedded unit of 
analysis 2 
Flagship project leader 2 
Embedded unit of 
analysis… 
Flagship project leader… 
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Figure 2: Research design 
 
Analytical strategy 
The overall analytical strategy is to ask specific questions to the case and to the embedded 
units of analysis, i.e. the FPLs, in order to enable answering the research. The empirical 
analysis builds on mapping of main features selected by following theoretical propositions in 
the MLG literature (Yin, 2009:130). Knowing the type of actor is relevant for the proposition 
that there is a multitude of actors. Nationality is also seen as relevant, since the EUSBSR is a 
transnational MLG arrangement. 
For the detailed analysis, an analytical framework has been constructed out from theoretical 
propositions in the literature on participation opportunities. The analytical framework is 
applied to a sample of eight FPLs.  
3.1 Collection of the data 
According to Yin (2009:69-70), the case study should be made by asking questions to the 
case, as a way to find evidence for answering the research question. This resembles the 
questions asked by an interviewer to its interviewees. In this thesis, all FPLs in the Action 
Plans had been asked questions concerning nationality and actor type.  
In the detailed part of the empirical analysis, data, or evidence, has been collected by asking 
eight of the FPLs questions based on the categories in the analytical framework. The set of 
questions form a protocol (see appendix 1), similar to an interviewer’s interview guide (Yin, 
2009:86-87). Yin (2009, 118-119) suggests, that the evidence in case studies is organised in 
case reports, as a way to create a case study database. The data, or evidence, collected here is 
therefore assembled in separate research reports for each FPL. The reports are available from 
EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region 
Multi-Level Governance 
Action Plan (95 FPLs) 
8 Selected FPLs 
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the author on demand. The data has been sorted in tables, according to the preselected 
categories, and the data is linked to the theoretical proposition through pattern matching (Yin, 
2009:34, 139-141).  
The empirical material 
The FPLs analysed belong to the flagship projects listed in the January 2012 version of the 
EUSBSR Action Plan (European Commission, 2012b). In many cases, the FPL of the flagship 
project is not specified, and nationality is the only information given. The contact list 
available at the EUSBSR webpage has been consulted in order to gain more precise 
information. According to EUSBSR contact persons, those are the only documents available. 
As additional compliments, web pages concerning the flagship projects and FPLs, and the 
Commission’s progress report, were also consulted.4 For flagship projects where uncertainties 
concerning leadership still remained, the flagship project was excluded. In total 95 FPLs were 
identified and included in the analysis. Webpages has been the main source for determining 
type of actor. 
For the detailed analysis of eight FPLs, a greater variety of documents is used, and which 
mainly consist of information available at the FPLs’ webpages such as presentations, annual 
reports, organisation statistics, and operational plans, but also of information request by e-
mail
5
. The empirical material used in this thesis does therefore include both qualitative and 
quantitative data.  
Reflections on the data 
The empirical material consists of data collected from various kinds of documents. One 
advantage of using documents as sources is that it is an unobtrusive method for data 
collection. A lot of attention has been given to eight selected units of analysis, and since 
evidences and issues have emerged during the investigation, relying on documents has made 
it possible to go back and ask further questions (Yin, 2009: 102). 
The empirical material, and the method used for collecting data, set some limitations for the 
scope of this research. Interviews was considered, but not found suitable since it was 
prioritised to get a wider view on the issue. It was also preferred to analyse the actors as a 
                                                 
4
 See “Empirical material” under “References and empirical material” for information concerning main 
documents for identifying FPLs. 
5
 See “Empirical material” under “References and empirical material”. 
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whole, rather than basing it on the perspective of one interviewee from each FPL, which 
would have been the only feasible number given the time limits of the study. Furthermore, it 
would have been more difficult to go back to the material. 
To a large extent, it is the nature of the research subject, i.e. participants in MLG 
arrangements, that primarily sets limitations for the analysis. The sample will not be a 
homogenous sample since the units of analysis, i.e. the FPLs, differ from each other in many 
aspects, such as type of actor and nationality. This is also reflected in the type of material 
available, and has created a need for flexibility during data collection and analysis. For some 
of the actors more data could be collected than for others, and there are certain language 
limitations. In order to minimise the risk that the availability of data influence the result, the 
depth of analysis is placed on a level where sufficient data could be collected on all the actors. 
3.2 Sample 
The FPLs in the overview analysis includes all those 95 FPLs that could be identified, and 
should therefore not be seen as a sample for FPLs, but rather as a demarcation. However, the 
95 FPLs are seen as a sample of EUSBSR participants. The reason for focusing exclusively 
on FPLs is that it is almost impossible to identify all actors participating in flagship projects, 
or other projects that can be seen to contribute to the EUSBSR. In addition, it is here assumed 
that a FPL’s choice to participate is active and consciously made.   
For the detailed analysis, a smaller sample consisting of eight FPLs has been selected. A 
purposive sampling is made, where the selection is primarily theory based, and guided by the 
core assumption in MLG theory that actors from different levels and sectors should been 
included (Bryman, 2008:414-415). A variety of actor types is therefore aimed at, while 
nationality is given secondary priority. Therefore, the sample must not necessarily be 
representative for the actual distribution of actors of the EUSBSR. 
In order to avoid bias in the selection, and to obtain a sample which is somewhat 
representative for the EUSBSR as a whole, it was the intention to select two FPLs from each 
of the EUSBSR’s four pillars, and that belonged to different priority areas. However, due to 
the priority given to variety of actor types, in combination with practical limitations, this 
could not be fully achieved.  
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4. Analytical framework  
The analytical framework is constructed around themes derived from theory and previous 
research. It is used in order to guide the collection of data. Evidences are found by posing 
questions corresponding to each variable (see appendix 1). In this chapter, it is elaborated how 
these themes are operationalized as variables.   
The great variety of actors clearly makes it more difficult to find variables that can be applied 
uniformly to all actors. However, in order to evaluate multi-level governance (MLG) 
arrangements, this thesis considers it as a requisite to apply an analytical framework designed 
to the multi-actors reality of MLG arrangements. Therefore, four broad and more general 
main variables have been formed: resources, position in society, access to information and 
channels of influence, and affectedness. In order to measure an actor’s performance on each 
variable, different indicators have been developed. The indicators are rather flexible, and 
some of them are applicable only to one type of actor. The reason for designing a more 
flexible analytical framework is that how an actor is evaluated depends a lot on the type of 
actor. Does it mean the same for an environmental non-governmental organisation as for a 
municipality to have a strong position in society? Does the number of employees matter for an 
actor’s opportunity to participate in the EUSBSR, if those persons are employed within 
maintenance work?  
Employees as a resource might be more important for an interest organisation than another 
type of actor, since the employees work at an interest organisation might be more targeted 
towards influencing policy. It can therefore be more relevant to evaluate strength in resources, 
by how those are allocated rather than the actual financial capital. A sub-national authority 
(SNA) might have a high number of employees, but whether those employees work with 
elderly care or in representation offices in Brussels is more significant for participation in the 
EUSBSR, than the actual number of employees.  
Furthermore, an actor’s position in society can be evaluated from its domination in the area 
(Uhrwing 2001), but for a SNA it is also is important which competences and constitutional 
basis it has, i.e. if it’s a strong or weak region (Jeffery, 2000). 
Whether or not an actor perceives itself as affected by the EUSBSR might be more difficult to 
say, however, it can be one of the most important factors for whether or not an actor decides 
to get involved in the first place. Measuring affectedness is interconnected with the  
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other indicators, since those are relevant for an actor’s perception of how relevant it is to get 
mobilised (Piattoni, 2010). 
  Figure 3: Analytical framework 
Resources  
 -financial resources  number 
 -employees    number 
 -representation offices   yes/no 
 -expertise    in the issue of the Priority Area 
  
Position in society  
-competences/responsibility central role, power to implement  
-domination   dominance of organisation 
- strength    type of region 
- members/territorial scope number or territorial scope 
Access to information and channels of influence 
 -networks in Baltic Sea Region yes/no, type of network 
 -representation office in Brussels yes/no 
Affectedness      
 -cooperation interest  interest in Baltic Sea Region
        cooperation  
    interest in transnational/cross-border
        cooperation 
 -issue interest  interest in the issue as such 
   competence connected to issue 
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4.1 Operationalization 
The analytical framework is applied to a sample of eight actors, in order to get a better and 
more detailed understanding of what factors that are favourable for an actor’s participation 
opportunities. The subsequent section will describe how the analytical framework and its 
indicators are operationalized.  
Resources 
Resources have been put forward, primarily by pluralists, as a factor increasing an actor’s 
opportunity to participate. However, there are several kinds of resources, and they can also be 
measured differently. The most obvious one is financial resources, which here will be 
measured by the size of the budget in euros.  
In the analysis by Uhrwing (2001), the number of employees is used as an indicator for 
resources, due to difficulties to gain access to information concerning then budget. Therefore, 
data concerning the number of employees for each actor has also been included in this 
analysis. 
Nevertheless, the size of a budget or the number of employees gives no indication of how 
those resources are spent. An actor, especially if it is not an interest organisation, has other 
responsibilities not connected to political involvement or promotion of interests. For instance, 
an authority responsible for providing education might include teachers among its employees. 
It is therefore of interest to consider how the financial resources are allocated and if an actor 
has prioritised representation of its interest. This is why whether or not an actor is has a 
representation office in Brussels is included as an indicator as well.  
Expertise is another resource which can be important for any organisations opportunity to 
participate. According to Uhrwing (2001:260), interest organisations which have expert 
knowledge in an issue, rather than those with more general policy ideas, have better access to 
political decision-making processes. Since the EUSBSR is not about one specific interest, it 
will here be considered whether or not an actor has a certain expertise connected to the 
priority area which the flagship project is a part of. It is the project, and not the leaders as 
such, that are selected to become flagship projects. If an FPL is an expert, it can be considered 
that projects with experts have a greater opportunity to be selected.  
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Position in society 
Within all three theoretical strands; corporatism, sub national mobilisation, and pluralism, 
there are indications that if an actor has a strong position in society, it increases their 
opportunities to participate. When it comes to interest organisations, one often speaks of how 
dominant an organisation is. If it is a subnational authority (SNA), it is clear that some SNAs 
have greater possibilities to influence and access EU policy if they have a strong 
constitutional basis (Bomberg & Peterson, 1998; Jeffery, 2000). An actor’s function or role in 
society can also be regarded as a kind of resource which from pluralist perspective would be a 
favourable factor (Uhrwing, 2001:24). The question here is if the dominance of an interest 
organisation, the constitutional basis of a SNA, or the societal function of any actor, has an 
effect on the actor’s opportunity to participate in the EUSBSR. For all actors, it should be 
relevant to consider what power to implement an actor has. Moreover, many actors are nation 
based and it is thus relevant to consider the geographical scope of an actor and its number of 
members.   
To operationalize the variable ‘position in society’ in a precise way is difficult. Regarding the 
indicator dominance, Uhrwing (2001), operationalize it by determining whether an actor is 
perceived as dominant, or the natural representative, within the area of issue by the decision-
makers. Since the empirical material in this thesis is not based on interviews, such a 
categorisation depends on how an actor presents itself. Dominance can also be understood as 
being without competition (Uhrwing 2001), but this is also difficult to operationalize, and it 
entails ambiguities. For instance, a Danish agricultural association might be without 
competition nationally, but at the same time it is not the only agricultural association in the 
Baltic Sea region, since there agricultural association in the other EUSBSR member states as 
well. Therefore, it cannot easily be determined whether or not the actor is dominant.  
Another aspect to take into consideration regarding an actor’s position in society, is that for 
SNAs, it is more connected to its constitutional basis (Jeffery, 2000). Questions concerning an 
actor’s dominance, or whether or not it is a producer organisation, are in practice irrelevant. 
An actor’s position in society is therefore operationalized in a more general and flexible way. 
It is general in the sense that it is an overall discussion related to concepts such as dominance, 
function in society, competence, and responsibility. It is flexible in the sense that it is taken 
into consideration, that what kind of position in society that is particularly advantageous 
depends on the type of actor.    
28 
 
Access to information and channels of influence 
Another factor that can increase an actor’s opportunity to participate is access to information 
and channels of influence. Networks can provide both information as well as influence 
(Michalowitz, 2007:135). In the case of the EUSBSR, it is therefore assumed that networks 
within the Baltic Sea region are relevant for an actor’s access to information and as a channel 
of influence. Hence one factor that can be assumed to be favourable for an actor’s opportunity 
to participate in the EUSBSR is that it already participates in cooperation within the Baltic 
Sea region. The fact that there are no new institutions created could make this factor even 
more important.  
Affectedness 
One factor that can determine whether or not an actor will participate is if it regards it as 
relevant to do so. In a nation state, it is quite easy to say who has the right to vote, but when it 
comes to MLG arrangements, who is included and excluded is much more difficult to say. 
The basis for participatory ideals is that those affected are granted the right to participate. The 
EUSBSR has not set any limits to the issues that can be included, and almost any issue or 
interest could be sorted into one of the strategies four pillars. It is neither addressing any actor 
in particular, which can be compared to the right to vote which is commonly connected to 
citizenship and age. To some extent it is geographically limited to its eight member states, 
which has 85 million inhabitants. However, the EU institutions and the EU 27 member states 
are clearly involved, and the projects include actors outside the EU as well, e.g. Russia and 
Norway.  
Therefore, it is relevant to asses if the actor is participating because it considers itself 
particularly affected by the EUSBR. As explained, almost any actor could theoretically be 
considered as being affected by the strategy. What is meant here by particularly affected is 
that they either have a strong interest in cooperation in the Baltic Sea Region, or that they 
have a specific interest in the priority area as such. It could be argued that an actor which does 
not have any real interest in Baltic Sea Region cooperation or in the specific issue area, will 
not find the EUSBSR as relevant. However, given the geographical as well as political scope 
of the EUSBSR, there could in reality be opportunities that are not taken by an actor, if it does 
not perceive itself as affected. It can also be argued that an actor must find the issue to be at a 
relevant level (Piattoni, 2010) A distinction is therefore made between actual affectedness and 
perceived affectedness. What is investigated here is whether there are evidences pointing to 
that the actor perceive itself as affected by the EUSBSR.   
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The variable affectedness is therefore operationalized by identifying if the actor explicitly 
expresses an interest either for cooperation in the Baltic Sea Region in general, or for the issue 
of the priority area it is participating in.  
5. Empirical analysis 
The empirical analysis is made on two levels. First, a categorisation of all flagship project 
leaders (FPL) by actor type and nationality is made, and presented in table 1 and 2, as well as 
in appendix 2. The aim is to identify which actors that are participating as FPLs.  
The second part of the empirical analysis is a more thorough analysis of eight FPLs. The aim 
is to get a more detailed understanding of what factors that seems to be favourable for an 
actor’s opportunity to participate. 
5.1 Empirical findings  
Here, a summary of the results of both empirical analyses are presented and discussed on a 
more general level. The complete analyses can be found in appendices 2 and 3. 
Categorisation of flagship project leaders 
According to the literature, multi-level governance (MLG) arrangements are characterised by 
participation of a broad range of actors (Piattoni, 2010:84). An empirical analysis of the types 
of actors participating in the EUSBSR has therefore been made and the results are presented 
in table 1.  
Table 1: Types of actors 
Actor type Number % 
National Government Agency (NGA) 27 28% 
National Ministry (NMIN) 24 25% 
Intergovernmental Organisation (IGO) 10 11% 
Interest Organisation (IO) 8 8% 
Sub-national  Authority (SNA) 7 7% 
National Government Research Institute (NGRI) 6 6% 
Academia (ACA) 5 5% 
EU institution/agency (EUA) 4 4% 
Private Company (PC) 2 2% 
National Government Company (NGC) 1 1% 
Research Institute (RI) 1 1% 
Categorisation of flagship project leaders (FPL) listed in appendix 2. Since two of the FPLs  
were both NGA and NGRI, one is counted as a NGA and the other one as a NGRI. There is 
a total of 95 FPLs, but only 79 flagship projects (FP). This is because some of the FPs have  
more than one FPL. 
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The results presented in table 1 give evidence that the MLG aspirations of the EUSBSR do 
not correspond to the empirical data. A majority of the FPLs are either National Government 
Agencies (NGA) or National Ministries (NMIN). Moreover, these two actor types are part of 
the same organisation, since a NGA is the operational part of a NMIN. Hence, the two actor 
types can be combined, and when that is done, they stand for 53 % of the FPLs. If putting all 
national governmental actors (NGA, NMIN, NGRI, and NGC) together, they make up 59 % 
of the FPL’s. National governmental actors are also represented in Intergovernmental 
Organisations (IGO), which can be seen as a transnational governmental actor. It can 
therefore be concluded that the EUSBSR does not seem to be as participatory as had been 
expected. Rather, it seems to confirm the participatory myth proposed by Smismans (2008), 
who found evidence that national administrations still are predominant in new types of 
governance. Stocchiero (2010:5) claimed that “central governments are the nodes of the 
macro-regional system” and that “the macro-regional strategy lays in the political wills of the 
central governments”(Stocchiero, 2010:5). Apparently, this seems to be reflected in 
participation among FPLs as well. Hence, this is in some aspects connected to its position in 
society, or rather position in the EUSBSR, which will be further discussed in chapter 5.2.  
Flagship project leaderships by nationality 
Since the EUSBSR is a transnational cooperation, it could be expected that there is a certain 
representativeness regarding nationality. Criticism have been put forward in the initial phase 
of the EUSBSR that some member states are more involved as coordinators than others 
(Bengtsson, 2009:7). Furthermore, since the EUSBSR is supposed to make use of existing 
cooperation in the Baltic Sea region instead of creating new institutions, it could be expected 
that actors who are not nation based participate as well. A categorisation of the FPLs 
nationality has therefore been made and the results are presented in table 2. 
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Table 2: Flagship project leaders by nationality 
Nationality Flagship project leaders % 
Sweden 21 22% 
Germany 15 16% 
Finland 13 14% 
Transnational 12 13% 
Denmark 10 11% 
Lithuania 9 9% 
Poland 8 8% 
EU 4 4% 
Latvia 2 2% 
Estonia 1 1% 
The categories transnational and EU has been added, since not all actors belong to a  
 member state.  
The results show that even if actors from all EUSBSR member states, including transnational 
and EU actors, are participating as FPLs, the distribution is uneven. For instance, there is a 
clear overrepresentation of Swedish actors. It might not be as surprising that Estonia has the 
least number of FPLs, given that it is the smallest country within the EU Baltic Sea region and 
stand for only 1,5 % of the total population. However, Sweden’s population only makes up 
for 11 % of the total population in the EU Baltic Sea region, but it has 22% of the flagship 
project leaderships
6
. According to Greer et al. (2008), post-communist states are 
underrepresented in interest representation in the EU, due to lack of resources. This seems to 
be the case for participation in the EUSBSR as well, where the bottoms four member states in 
table 2, are the post-communist states in the EUSBSR. The effect of resources will be further 
analysed in chapter 5.2.  
Another comparison that can be made is between national and transnational actors. It seems as 
83% of the actors belongs to a member state, and that can question to what extent the strategy 
use existing cooperation in the region for its implementation. 
                                                 
6
 Approximated calculation based on a Baltics Sea region population of 85 million (European Commission, 
2011) an Estonian population of 1,3 million, and a Swedish populations of 9,5 million (Eurostat 2012). 
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Results of detailed analysis 
After analysing 95 FPLs, i.e. all those FPLs that could be identified in the EUSBSR’s Action 
Plan, a more thorough analysis is made of eight if those FPLs. The analytical framework from 
chapter 4 (figure 3), has been applied in order to get a more detailed understanding of what 
factors that seems to be favourable for an actor’s participation opportunities. A presentation of 
the eight FPLs is found in table 3. The results of the analysis are found in appendix 3, while a 
summary of the findings is presented in table 4.  
Table 3: Presentation of the selected flagship project leaders 
Actor Type and Nationality Flagship project Additional 
information 
Ministry of Economic 
Affairs and 
Communications, Estonia  
National Ministry, 
Estonia 
6.3. Increase the use of electronic 
signatures/e-identification 
 
VINNOVA  National Government 
Agency, 
Sweden 
7.1. BSR Stars. Develop a Baltic 
Sea Region Programme for 
Innovation, Clusters and SME-
Networks 
Sweden’s 
governmental 
agency for 
innovation systems 
Admiral Danish Fleet Head 
Quarters 
National Government 
Agency, 
Denmark 
14.2. Map existing marine 
pollution response capacities and 
make sub-regional plans for cross-
border response cooperation. 
Under the Danish 
Ministry of 
Defence 
HELCOM, the Helsinki 
Commission 
Intergovernmental 
cooperation, 
Transnational 
3.4. Development of HELCOM 
Core Set Indicators 
Baltic marine 
environment 
protection 
Commission. 
Region Blekinge Sub-national 
Authority, 
Sweden 
4.5. Improve the waste handling 
on board and in ports 
Regional council in 
south-east Sweden 
University of Greifswald Academia, 
Germany 
(Mecklenburg-
Vorpommern) 
12.10. Develop strategies for 
sustainable tourism 
Full name: Ernst 
Moritz Arndt 
University of 
Greifswald.  
Agrifood Research 
Finland, MTT 
National Government 
Research Institute, 
Finland 
9.8. Establish a Forum for 
Inventive and Sustainable Manure 
Processing 
Finnish acronym: 
MTT 
Hanseatic Parliament Interest Organisation. 
Transnational.  
12.2. BSR-Quick. (Education and 
qualification for SME’s)  
Association, 
registered in 
Germany as Hanse-
Parliament e.V. 
Flagship projects in Action Plan 2012 version (European Commission, 2009). For further information, see 
appendix 3. 
The main purpose of table 3 is to provide the reader with basic information concerning the 
eight selected FPLs that are soon to be discussed. As can be seen, the selected FPLs represent 
a quite wide range of actors. Even the two NGA’s are quite different from each other, since 
the Admiral Danish Fleet, as part of the Danish defence, has more practical tasks, while 
VINNOVA’s tasks are much more related to development.  
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However, the main interest regarding these FPLs concerns information related to the four 
main factors. In table 4, the eight FPLs are compared on the same factors, following the 
analytical framework (figure 3).  
Table 4: Summary of results from detailed analysis  
 Resources Position in society Access to channels 
of influence and 
information 
Affectedness 
Ministry of 
Communications 
and Economic 
Affairs Estonia 
Medium (S, e) Strong Medium Yes. Issue 
VINNOVA Strong (S, R, E) Strong Medium Yes. Issue 
Admiral Danish 
Fleet HQ 
Medium (S, e) Strong Low Yes. Issue  
HELCOM Medium (E) Strong High Yes. Issue and 
region. 
Region Blekinge Medium (R, e) Neutral High Yes. Region and 
issue. 
University of 
Greifswald 
Medium (S, E) Neutral Unclear, but seems 
to be low. 
Yes. Issue and 
region. 
Agrifood Research 
Finland (MTT) 
Strong (S, E) Strong Unclear, but seems 
to be low. 
Yes. Issue and 
region. 
Hanseatic 
Parliament 
Less (e) Neutral (not clear) Medium Yes. Region and 
issue 
Overview of analytical results in appendix 3. Resources is labelled strong (scores on 2-3 points), medium (scores 
on 2-1 points), less (scores on 0-1 points), the categories overlaps in order to allow for more flexible 
categorisations, since it is not possible to maintain strict borders. The letter within the parentheses are the type of 
resource (Staff, Representation, Expertise and experience). Position in society is strong (central society function 
or role, dominate within its field), medium (does not seem to have an exceptional position), weak (marginalised 
role). Access to information is dependent on two indicators, and is categorised as high (2 channels), medium (1 
channel) or low (no access). Affectedness is the most difficult to categorise, and therefore it only indicates 
whether there is any affectedness, and in which aspect. If it is affectedness by both issue and region, the one that 
is perceived as strongest is written first. See appendix 3 for the full analysis 
The table above includes both quantitative and qualitative data from each of the eight FPLs. 
The scorings are based on the analytical results in appendix 3, in the next section each factors 
is discussed more in detail.  
The only variable where the results are the same for all actors is affectedness by the issue. 
Most of the actors have some resources, even if it is only one or two. During the analysis, it 
became apparent that some of the actors had a significant knowledge in the area of issue from 
experience (e), rather than formal expertise (E). Therefore, it is clear that experience relevant 
for the issue seem to be a favourable factor as well.  Besides those findings, here seem to be 
no typical participant when all factors and actors are taken together. Some scores high on 
many variables, e.g. VINNOVA, while some are strong on only one of them, e.g. the 
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Hanseatic Parliament. Interpreting these results requires that the analytical results in appendix 
3 are discussed more in detail. 
5.2 Analysis of empirical findings 
Resources 
According to previous research, resources are favourable for an actor’s opportunity to 
participate. The analysis was made by collecting data on of different kinds of resources. Due 
to insufficient and poor availability of data, it was decided not to include financial resources 
as an indicator. The analysis shows that experience, in addition to expertise, seems to matter. 
Moving on to the number of employees, there seems to be no evidence that a high number of 
employees favours an actor’s opportunity to participate. The number of employees ranges 
from 8 at the Hanseatic Parliament to 5 846 at the University of Greifswald (see appendix 3). 
However, it was noticed that this data includes different kinds of employees. Uhrwing (2001) 
point out that the effect of the number of employees can depend on how many who are 
working with a specific issue. Even if the data included in this analyse does not allow for any 
thorough analysis regarding this possibility, some things can be said. The University of 
Greifswald, as a larger organisation both in terms of size and field of activity, has a greater 
variety of employees, in comparison to the Hanseatic Parliament that has a much more narrow 
focus. The indicator ‘Representation in Brussels’, that was applied in order to grasp how 
resources were allocated, did, however, not show any clear tendencies that it would matter.  
The discussion concerning employees is to some extent related to the next resource, namely 
expertise. This factor is put forward by Coen (2007), Uhrwing (2001) as well as Smismans 
(2008), and it is commonly denoted that  EU officials’ are in need of external expertise (Coen, 
2007). In the case if the EUSBSR, it is quite difficult to precise what kind of expertise that 
can be regarded as a resource since the EUSBSR is not about one single issue. Initially, the 
focus of the analysis was on formal expertise relevant for the priority area issue. During the 
analysis, it became apparent that while only some of the actors could be called experts; all 
actors seemed to have significant experience regarding the issue. Smismans (2008) put most 
emphasis on technical expertise, while Uhrwing (2001) admit that detailed knowledge of a 
less technical nature matter as well. Considering the findings here, there seems to be reasons 
to further reflect up on who is an expert, and what expertise is. In a narrow understanding of 
expertise, the empirical findings (see table 4 and appendix 3) show that there are both experts 
and non-experts participating. However, if one broadens the definition and also considers 
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whether there might be some degree of expertise, or significant experience, all evidence point 
to that it could be a favourable factor.  
Another thing that should be taken into consideration is that being a flagship leader entails 
certain obligations concerning administration, communication, and cooperation (Interact 
2012b). This could be a role which also requires project management skills, and in such case, 
expertise or experience of project management might be a significant resource as well. Coen 
(2007) points out organisational capacity as one factor that increases an actor’s opportunities 
to participate, and it is not unlikely that this factor would matter for the EUSBSR as well. 
In conclusion, the initial analysis did not give any strong indications that resources would be 
significant for an actor’s opportunity to participate, either as number of employees, 
representation, or expertise. However, an extended definition of expertise which includes 
experience, give evidence that this seems to be a favourable factor.  If this is the case, the 
effect of the implementation of the EUSBSR could be that those already experienced become 
even more experienced, since they are given more opportunities to cooperate with others on 
the matter, as well as to gain access to funding if that is allocated for macro-regional 
strategies. In order to fully understand the significance of expertise, it is necessary to critically 
reflect on the concept of expertise when discussing participation opportunities. 
Position in society 
As has been described earlier, position in society is a broad theme under which it is analysed 
what position the actors have and in what respect this affect an actor’s opportunity to 
participate. The aim is to determine whether the actor has a particularly strong position. Since 
the factor is constructed out of various theoretical perspectives, the analysis is conducted in a 
more flexible way. In table 4, it can be seen which actors that seem to have a particular strong 
position in society, but it is not given in which way this position is favourable. By going 
further into the empirical findings, it could be seen that the conclusions in chapter 5.1 were 
correct, and that national governmental actors possess a certain position. 
From a first glance at the results presented in table 4, it can be seen that there are at least five 
actors that seem to have a strong position in society. However, this is not because they are 
producer organisations, which is emphasised within corporatism (Coen 2007, Uhrwing 2001).  
What give these five actors a certain position in society is that they are national governmental 
actors. Even if, multi-level governance (MLG) implies a diffusion of power from the member 
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states to other levels and sectors (Lisbet Hooghe & Marks, 2011:17), it seems as the central 
position enjoyed by the national governmental actors still remains. Within corporatism, it is 
assumed that an actor gain a privileged position since it is needed or can be used for policy 
implementation (Uhrwing 2001). As national governmental actors, may it be ministries or 
agencies, undeniably have competences crucial for policy implementation, they automatically 
gain a strong position in society. Furthermore, Stocchiero (2010) claim that central 
governments have key positions within the EUSBSR.  
Since 59% of the FPLs are national governmental actors (see table 1), it can be concluded that 
being a national governmental actor per se seem to be a favourable position. This finding is 
therefore less connected to theories of actors’ participation opportunities, presented in chapter 
2.2, and it is rather a question related to the MLG literature.  
Still, there are non-national governmental actors participating as well, and some observations 
can be made concerning these actors. For instance, both Jeffery (2000) and Bomberg & 
Peterson (1998) claim that sub-national authorities (SNA) can hold a strong position in 
society by their constitutional basis. However, the SNA analysed in detail, Region Blekinge, 
would not be regarded as a particularly strong SNA by their constitutional basis. This 
confirms what Jeffery (2000) and Bomberg & Peterson (1998) also concludes; there seem to 
be other factors that also can be favourable for an SNA’s opportunity to participate.  
Dominance is another concept that is mentioned in connection to position in society, 
especially by Uhrwing (2001). There were two actors that could be regarded as dominant 
within their issue areas, and that is HELCOM and Agrifood Research Finland (see appendix 
2.3). HELCOM seem to be perceived as a dominant actor, and Agrifood Research Finland 
claims to be a leading organisation. This could therefore be a factor to take into consideration. 
HELCOM might even be said to have been granted a special place in the EUSBSR, since its 
importance is mentioned in the Communications as well as in the Action Plan (European 
Commission 2009, 2012a, 2012b).  
Concerning geographical coverage, the findings do not present a uniformed picture. Two of 
the organisations which are not national governmental actors cover the whole Baltic Sea 
region, namely HELCOM and the Hanseatic Parliament, and this might have given them 
some strength. Yet, Region Blekinge and the University of Greifswald cover quite small 
geographic territories.  
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When discussing position in society, it is also relevant to take a look at the role of producer 
organisations. Coen (2007) is one of those finding indications that business organisations 
enjoy an advantageous role in policy-making. The Hanseatic Parliament is the only interest 
organisation analysed here and does in fact represent private interests. The analysis presented 
in table 1 does not give any information regarding what type of interests the other interest 
organisations represent, and it is therefore not possible to say whether the Hanseatic 
Parliament represents the exception or the rule. However, only two private companies are 
FPLs, which at least can confirm that being a producer per se is not an advantage.  
To sum up, the conclusions that can be made concerning an actor’s position in society is that 
as the detailed analysis (table 4) reveals, it is not necessary to have a particularly strong 
position for having the opportunity to participate, and that it is enough to have a neutral 
position. However, since those who have a strong position in society all represents national 
governmental actors, and given that 59% of the flagship leaders are national governmental 
actors, it seems that having a formal position in society, i.e. being a national governmental 
actors, is a strongly favourable factor. It challenges the participatory ideal of MLG as such, 
and seem to further confirm the view of Smismans (2008). This is also the best clue to what a 
strong position in society means in the context of the EUSBSR, since there was no clear-cut 
answer to what a strong position might be among the non-national governmental actors. 
  
Access to information and channels of influence 
According to the findings in table 4, it does not seem that access to information and influence 
channels would be favourable for an actor’s opportunity to participate, since the degree of 
access ranges from high to low. However, the more detailed presentation of analytical 
findings in appendix 3, give indications that there are reasons to be cautious when drawing 
conclusions, and that table 4 excludes some important aspects. This is further discussed and 
elaborated on in the subsequent section.  
Starting with participation and membership in Baltic Sea Region network or forums for 
cooperation, the data available was at some points unclear, and it is important to take into 
consideration whether or not cooperation was established already before the EUSBSR. 
Admittedly, it is easier to confirm than to reject participation in networks. Among the actors, 
Region Blekinge is the actor who seems to be the most active participant in Baltic Sea region 
cooperation. About half of the eight FPLs mention some sort of cooperation in the Baltic Sea 
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region. The others were less specific and referred to EU cooperation in general. Therefore, it 
cannot be confirmed that participating in Baltic Sea region cooperation would be favourable. 
Nevertheless, even if networks according to Bomberg & Peterson (1998) are informal 
channels of influence, those included in the analysis are formal in the way that they are 
officially established. It cannot be excluded that even more informal forms of cooperation 
exist.  
When it comes to representation in Brussels, this is a far less abstract indicator than Baltic Sea 
region cooperation, even if  Bomberg & Peterson (1998) see it as an informal channel of 
influence as well. No strong evidence could be found, that representation in Brussels would 
matter, as only three out of the eight actors seem to have representation there. However, it is 
important to keep in mind, that the national governments are represented by their permanent 
representations. Given the dominance of these actor types among the FPLs in the EUSBSR 
(see table 1), representation in Brussels could have an effect. Both Moore (2008) and Marks et 
al., (2010) admits that there are different objectives for having a representation office in 
Brussels. This might be a factor worth looking further into, in order to see whether it has 
different importance for different types of actors. 
Even if there seem to be no clear evidence that high access to information and channels of 
influence would be favourable when the eight FPLs are taken together, there are three specific 
FLPs that are worth more discussion. 
The first is Region Blekinge, which is the actor who seems to have highest access to 
information and channels of influence by its participation in several Baltic Sea region 
networks, as well as by representation in Brussels. Since both coalition building and 
representation in Brussels are particularly connected to participation opportunities of SNAs 
(Bomberg & Peterson, 1998), this might indicate that access to information and channels of 
influence is particularly important for SNAs. Within sub-national mobilisation literature, it 
has been discussed what significance representation offices have in practice (Jeffery, 2000; 
Moore, 2008). Both Jeffery (2000) and Moore (2008), conclude that the effectiveness of a 
representation office is dependent on the characteristics of the SNA. It would therefore be 
valuable to make a more thorough investigation of the other SNAs participating in the 
EUSBSR, in order to see if there are any common features among these SNAs. 
The second FPL of particular interest is the Hanseatic Parliament. Building coalitions is often 
mentioned as favourable for an actor’s opportunity to participate. Since the Hanseatic 
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Parliament is an association of 45 members, and has as its objective to promote small and 
medium sized companies in the region (see appendix 3), it is per se a strategic coalition. Thus, 
it is first and foremost a channel of influence for its members.   
Lastly, another FPL which stands out is HELCOM. In resemblance with the Hanseatic 
Parliament, the organisation as such is a Baltic Sea region cooperation. What is interesting 
about HELCOM is that it rather is an actor who others seek to influence, than an actor seeking 
influence. Its cooperation in the Baltic Sea region, involves cooperating with relevant 
stakeholders within the region (see appendix 3). Thus, for HELCOM, access to information 
can rather be seen as a resource for the organisation’s work, than as a factor relevant for its 
opportunities to participate (Smismans, 2008) 
In sum, there are no clear indication concerning the significance of having access to 
information and channels of influence. It could be valuable to go deeper into the question of 
who is to be influenced, and what kind of information that is made available. The National 
Contact Points (NCP), which are appointed by the member states, have responsibilities 
concerning communicating the EUSBSR. How this task is executed by the NCP, might 
further explain the overrepresentation of some nationalities among the FPLs (see table 2). 
Whether recent efforts to improve the communication of the EUSBSR, made at a macro-
regional level, will affect these asymmetries is therefore interesting to analyse. 
 Affectedness 
The final point of discussion concerns affectedness. The purpose is to investigate whether 
there are any evidences, that the actor could perceive itself as particularly affected by the 
EUSBSR. It could either be affected by the EUSBSR’s geographical scope, or by the issues of 
the priority area. To assess an actor’s affectedness is a complex task. Nevertheless, it is 
important to discuss affectedness, since it is not just a favourable factor. It can in fact be a 
basic condition for an actor’s initiative to participate at all. The detailed analysis shows that 
affectedness seems to have had that effect.  
As can be understood from previous research, it is much up to the actor itself to decide 
whether or not it is affected (Karlsson Schaffer, 2012; Sørensen, 2002). Theoretically, all 
actors in the Baltic Sea region could be considered geographically affected by the EUSBSR. 
Given that the EUSBSR’s main objectives covers a very broad range of issues, and that the 
Action Plan is a document that can be revised according to the needs, it can be assumed that 
almost any actor could be seen as affected by the EUSBSR’s issues. 
40 
 
The results presented in table 4, are unambiguous; all actors were found to be particularly 
affected by the EUSBSR. All of them had a special interest in the issue of the priority area, 
and some of them also seemed to have a clear interest for cooperation in the Baltic Sea region. 
As the analysis in appendix 3 show, there is a clear connection between the issue of the 
priority area and the interest of the FPL. One example is the Estonian Ministry of Economic 
Affairs and Communications who has among its priorities to achieve “a single market with as 
small differences as possible [and] support as extensively as possible harmonization of 
indirect taxes and abolition of exceptions as well as productive cross border cooperation” 
(Ministry of Economic Affairs and Communication Estonia, no date, b)
7
,  and who is 
participating in the priority area which concerns “to remove hindrances to the internal market 
in the Baltic Sea region including to improve cooperation in the customs area” (European 
Commission, 2012b). Among those who has the strongest affectedness by the issue one finds 
HELCOM, where the priority are concern “to reduce the use and impact of hazardous 
substances” (European Commission, 2012b), which is one of the organisations priorities. 
VINNOVA, as the Swedish Innovation agency dealing with developing innovation systems, 
does arguably have a clear interest in the issue of its priority area which is “to exploit the full 
potential of the region in research and innovation” (European Commission, 2012b). 
The stated priorities of an actor can have been made in accordance with its current activities. 
For instance, an actor might not have had an explicit interest for the issue when entering the 
flagship project, and that it has become a priority only after investing time, resources, and 
seeing results. There are however evidence (see appendix 3) of longer commitments. 
HELCOM, for instance, was giving priority to the issue already before, and it is unlikely that 
the main objective of an organisation like VINNOVA, Agrifood Research Finland or the 
Hanseatic Parliament would have been completely changed just by becoming a FPL.  
An actor’s interest in an issue is, in many respects, interconnected with an actor’s competence 
concerning the issue. According to Piattoni (2010), an actor’s competence is relevant for its 
judgement of whether it is appropriate to participate or not. In this manner, the Admiral 
Danish Fleet who is “responsible for military security and safety at sea, including pollution 
combating at sea” (Admiral Danish Fleet, no date, a)8, is affected by the issue “to reinforce 
protection from major emergencies at sea and on land” (European Commission, 2012b). 
                                                 
7
 See “Empirical material”, under “References and empirical material”. 
8
 See “Empirical material”, under “References and empirical material”. 
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Another example is the University of Greifswald, who might not seem to have a strong 
interest in achieving the aim of the priority area, “to maintain and reinforce attractiveness of 
the Baltic Sea region in particular through tourism” (European Commission, 2012b), but the 
issue is, however, within the working field of the institution for geology and geography, 
which has tourism as one of its specific focuses. 
As explained earlier, an actor can also be affected by the EUSBSR, by having an explicit 
interest for Baltic Sea region cooperation, and as can be seen in table 4, there are fewer FPLs 
who correspond to that. Region Blekinge is one of the actors who most clearly express an 
interest for Baltic Sea region cooperation, and it also express the strongest interest for the 
EUSBSR as such, by having formulated its own action plan for its work with the EUSBSR 
(see appendix 3). The University of Greifswald is a less clear cut case and its interest for 
Baltic Sea cooperation takes the form of research projects and partnership agreements. It 
seems to have a greater interest for studying the Baltic Sea region than to cooperate within it 
(see appendix 3). In contrast to this, HELCOM and the Hanseatic Parliament are two actors 
who can be seen to have Baltic cooperation as their main objective. The purpose of those 
organisations is to strengthen and foster cooperation in the Baltic Sea region, within their 
respective areas of activity. There are all reasons to assume, that those actors perceive 
themselves as affected by the EUSBSR as a Baltic Sea region cooperation project.    
Concerning those who did not express an interest for cooperation in the Baltic Sea region in 
specific, it can be added that those actors still seem to have an interest for transnational and/or 
EU cooperation. It could therefore further be analysed, if this is something which is common 
to a majority of the participants. There might be actors who are affected by the issues, but 
who have had more national focuses. Thus, they do not find transnational cooperation 
appropriate, which prevents them from considering transnational projects such as the 
EUSBSR as opportunities.  
During the analysis of the actors’ affectedness, two unexpected findings were also made. The 
first discovery was that two of the eight FPLs, the Estonian Ministry of Economic Affairs and 
Communication and VINNOVA, are in fact the Priority Area Coordinators (PAC), for the 
very same priority areas that they are participating in. As PACs, these two FPLs have central 
roles in the selection of FPLs, and they also have a strong interest in the successful 
implementation of the priority area and of the EUSBSR in general. Furthermore, by being 
formal parts of the EUSBSR governance structure and common participants in EUSBSR 
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meetings, they most probably have high access to information on the EUSBSR. Thus, in their 
competences as PACs, those FPLs have strong positions, a high degree of access to 
information and channels of influence, and a high level of affectedness by the EUSBSR, even 
if those aspects were not included when analysed as FPLs.  
The second unexpected finding was made when looking for why VINNOVA has an interest to 
participate in the EUSBSR. VINNOVA states that it has been given the task to lead the 
flagship project BSR-Stars, which is the flagship project that it is currently leading (see 
appendix 3). Accordingly, VINNOVA’s affectedness seems to be secondary to the 
affectedness of the Swedish government. Even if the national government is on a higher level 
deciding the work tasks of its national governmental agencies, it is interesting that VINNOVA 
is referring its participation in the flagship project to the government mission as explicitly. In 
that sense, the flagship project does not seem as a project which the civil servants at 
VINNOVA has found to be of interest to participate in.   
To sum up, evidence could be found that the actor’s analysed are particularly affected by the 
EUSBSR, and mainly on the basis of the issue of the priority area. Some of the actors also, 
and in some instances to a higher degree, perceived themselves as affected in regards to the 
geographical scope of the EUSBSR. However, several of the actors who did not express any 
specific interest for Baltic Sea region cooperation, still had an explicit interest for 
international cooperation. These findings are of high importance, since one must ask what 
happens to an actor who does not perceived itself as affected by the issues prioritised or by 
Baltic Sea region cooperation. As (Piattoni, 2010) argue, it is a risk that actors who are in fact 
affected by a policy, are excluded because they do no perceive themselves as being affected. 
This is of course a hypothetical scenario, but given that the analysis shows that all actors have 
a perceived affectedness of the EUSBSR, which may be related to a specific issue or to Baltic 
Sea region cooperation, there are evidences that perceived affectedness, by a potential actor, 
can be crucial for its opportunity to participate. More attention should be given to the aspect 
that whether or not an actor perceives itself as affected depends on definitions made by others. 
Excluding potential actors can affect the implementation of the EUSBSR, it can restrain 
actors from developing in area where they are currently underdeveloped, and it might in a 
longer perspective exclude them from gaining access to funding.  
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6. Conclusions 
This thesis asked what factors that seem to be favourable for an actor’s opportunity to 
participate in the EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region (EUSBSR). Based on the results of 
the empirical analysis, it can be concluded that experience, in addition to expertise, is a 
resource that seems to be favourable. However, being a national governmental actor seems to 
matter even more, as this gives a certain favourable position in society. Ultimately, whether or 
not an actor will participate at all, seems to depend on whether it perceives itself as affected 
by the issue or not.  
In accordance with the aim of the thesis, these conclusions should be discussed from a 
legitimacy perspective, focusing on the principle of equal opportunities to participate.  
It can be concluded that many of the factors found to be favourable in previous research, 
seemed to matter less in the case studied here. However, one factor could be added and that is 
experience, which extends the concept of expertise. For more general policy initiatives such 
as the EUSBSR, it seems relevant to consider what kind of expertise that is a resource. 
Expertise concerning project management could be just as important as expertise within the 
field. Hence, the definition of expertise used in previous research by for instance Smismans 
(2008), and in some respects also by Uhrwing (2001), needs to be further elaborated and more 
nuanced.  
The problem is that if actors with experience have better opportunities to participate, it can 
impede those lacking experience from learning by participating. It can thus create an elite 
situation, where those already experienced become even more experienced. This is clearly 
problematic from a normative legitimacy perspective, but it can also be negative for achieving 
the objectives of the EUSBSR, since it should be of value to involve actors who are less 
developed in a particular issue area, in order for them to learn and improve. 
The point of departure of this thesis was that the EUSBSR is a multi-level governance (MLG) 
arrangement, but the findings however give a contradictory picture. Even if there are a great 
variety of actors participating, the overrepresentation of national governmental actors is 
obvious. MLG has been discussed for many years, but it seems as it has not yet moved from 
theory to reality. It would be valuable to study how multi-level structured the flagship projects 
are in themselves, in order to conclude to what extent, or whether, the findings are connected 
to the leadership function as such.  
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Since being a national governmental actor, is a factor which not all actors possess or can 
obtain, it is a legitimacy problem. Given the inequalities regarding national distribution, it can 
also be asked to what extent the national commitment, organisation, and coordination of the 
EUSBSR affect how well it is communicated. It is problematic if the EUSBSR is less 
legitimate in some member states than in others. This is similar to the inequalities discovered 
by Bengtsson (2009) as well as Greer et al. (2008), even if it is here not a question of 
resources.  
Regarding non-national governmental actors, it cannot be confirmed, nor excluded, that they 
have equal opportunities to participate. For some factors, the actors’ characteristics 
corresponded quite well to the pattern predicted by theories connected to their specific actor 
type. Examples of this concern the Hanseatic Parliament’s position in society, as well as 
Region Blekinge’s access to information and channels of influence. This research was 
designed to apply the same analytical framework to all actors, but admittedly, it can be the 
case that different factors matters for different actors. This inherent problem of comparison 
makes it hard to evaluate, and to ensure, legitimacy of MLG arrangements. This point of 
criticism is crucial if legitimacy is to be regarded as not just a question of output or input, but 
of democracy as Piattoni (2010), as well as the author of this thesis, propose.  
Finally, the greatest challenge for legitimacy of the EUSBSR, and other MLG arrangements, 
could be the issue of affectedness. Within the literature, the concept of affectedness is used in 
a rather incautious manner. As for instance Sørensen (2002) uses the concept, it seems logical 
that those who perceive themselves as affected are included, while those who do not are 
excluded. However, this way of reasoning fail to take into consideration that whether or not 
an actor perceives itself as affected, depends on definitions already made by others. When 
developing MLG arrangements, more responsibility should be taken concerning who will 
perceive it as being affected. A thorough and serious discussion is needed concerning the 
difference between actual affectedness, and perceived affectedness (Karlsson Schaffer, 2012).    
As has been said, it seems as national governmental actors have a position which is 
favourable for their opportunity to participate. They also take great part in the shaping of the 
strategy, which has consequences for the actors’ perceived affectedness. This can create 
inequalities that cannot be solved by funding, nor by communication. What is needed is a 
critical reflection concerning for whom the strategy is supposed to be. 
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One could argue that since the primary function of the flagship projects is to implement the 
EUSBSR, it matters less who the participating actors are. However, it must be acknowledged 
that in MLG arrangements, political decisions are made during the implementation phase as 
well. The idea of MLG is to make those implementing policies, more involved in the making 
of these policies. Therefore, not only the effectiveness, but also the legitimacy of the 
EUSBSR, depends on multi-actor participation in all respects. If the macro-regional approach 
is further extended, and specific funding made available, the potential problem with 
legitimacy is even more serious.  
It is therefore proposed, that further research concerning MLG legitimacy should focus on the 
aspect of affectedness. This is crucial if the participatory aspect of MLG ideal is to be taken 
seriously. This thesis has also pointed to the need of further developing the concept of 
expertise in relation to participation opportunities in MLG arrangements, striving for a more 
nuanced, and empirically applicable understanding of the concept. A next step in the 
empirical research concerning the EUSBSR could be to further investigate what actual 
influence participation in a flagship project gives an actor.  
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Appendices 
Appendix 1 
Protocol for case study questions 
General question: Are there any factors that increase an actor’s opportunity to participate? 
Resources 
What resources does the actor have? 
- What is the size of the actor’s budget 
- How many employees does the actor have? 
- Does the actor have a representation office in Brussels? 
Position in society 
What position in society does the actor has, and is it particularly strong?  
- What competence and responsibility does the actor have? 
- How dominant is the organisation?   
- What constitutional basis does the actor have? 
- How many members does the actor have? 
Access to information and channels of influence 
What access to information and channels to information does the actor have? 
- Is the actor participant in other Baltic Sea region 
networks/cooperation/organisations? 
- Is the actor represented in Brussels? 
Affectedness 
Is the actor particularly affected by the EUSBSR? 
- Does the actor have an explicit interest for Baltic Sea region cooperation? 
- Does the actor have an explicit interested in the issue of the priority area? 
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Appendix 2 
Flagship project leaders 
FP Country Type Name Comment 
1.1 SE NGA Swedish Chemical Agency  
1.2 SE NGA Swedish Environmental Protection 
Agency 
 
(1.3) X X X  
1.4 LT PC Latvian Rural Advise and Training 
Centre 
 
1.5 FI NMIN Ministry of the Environment  
     
2.1 DE NMIN Federal Ministry for the Environment, 
Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety  
 
2.2 TRAN IGO HELCOM  
 DE NGA BSH Sweden might be 
involved, but lack of info. 
     
2.3 TRAN IGO HELCOM Germany might be 
involved, but lack of info. 
     
3.1 FI NGRI SYKE, Finnish Environment Institute  
3.2 PL NGA Chief inspectorate of Environmental 
Protection 
 
3.3 SE NGA/(NGRI) Swedish Geotechnical Institute Here counted as GA. 
3.4 TRAN IGO HELCOM  
3.5 FI NGRI SYKE, Finnish Environment Institute  
3.6 DE RI Fraunhofer Institute for Systems and 
Innovation Research (ISI)   
 
3.7 SE IO The International Chemical Secretariat Non-profit organisation 
3.8 SE NGA Medical Products Agency  
     
(4.1) X X X  
4.2 FI NGA Transport Safety Agency Trafi  
 SE NGA Swedish Maritime Administration  
 FI IO Baltic Institute of Finland  
(4.3) X X X  
4.4 FI NGA Transport Safety Agency Trafi  
4.5 SE SNA Region Blekinge  
4.6 DK NGA Danish Maritime Authority  
 TRANS IGO Nordic Council of Ministers  
     
5.1 DK NGA Danish Metrological Institute  
5.2 EU EUA DG ENERGY  
5.3 SE NMIN Ministry of the Environment  
 DE NMIN Federal Ministry for the Environment  
5.4 DK NGA Danish Metrological Institute According to project plan 
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6.1 PL NMIN Ministry of Economy  
 SE NGA National Board of Trade  
(6.2) X X X  
6.3 EE NMIN Ministry for Economic Affairs and 
Communications 
 
6.4 SE NGA Swedish Board for Accreditation 
Conformity Assessment SWEDAC and  
 
6.5 EU EUA DG TAXUD  
6.6 EU EUA DG TAXUD  
(6.7) X X X  
     
7.1 SE NGA VINNOVA  
 LT NMIN Ministry of Economy  
7.2 SE SNA Region Skåne  
7.3 LT NMIN Information Society Development 
Committee under the Ministry of 
Transport and Communications 
 
7.4 LT IO Lithuanian Biotechnology Association  
 DE IO BioCon Valley GmbH  
7.5 SE NGA Swedish Research Council  
     
8.1 DK NMIN Danish Ministry of Education  
8.2 PL NMIN Ministry of Higher Education  
8.3 DE NGA Federal Environment Agency  
8.4 DE NMIN Federal Ministry for the Environment, 
Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety 
 
 SE NGA Swedish Environmental Protection 
Agency 
 
8.5 DE NMIN Federal Ministry of Economics  
(8.6) X X X  
8.7 DE SNA Behörde für Wissenschaft und Forschung  
8.8 SE NGA Public Employment Service 
(Arbetsförmedlingen) 
 
     
9.1 SE  NMIN Ministry of Rural Affairs  
9.2 DK NMIN Ministry of Food, Agriculture and 
Fisheries 
 
9.3 PL NMIN Ministry of Agriculture and Rural 
Development 
 
 SE  IO Swedish national Network for Rural 
Development 
 
9.4 SE  NGA Swedish Agency for Marine and Water 
Management 
 
9.5 FI NGRI Finnish Game and Fisheries Research 
Institute 
 
9.6 TRANS IGO Nordic Council of Ministers  
9.7 TRANS IGO Nordic Council of Ministers  
9.8 FI NGRI MTT Agrifood Research Finland  
 DK IO CBMI Centre for bioenergy and 
environmental technology 
Actor type less clear. 
Innovation network. 
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9.9 DE NGRI/(NGA) Julius-Kühn-Institut Here counted as GRI. 
 FI NGRI MTT Agrifood Research Finland  
(9.10) X X X  
     
10.1 LT NMIN Ministry of Energy  
10.2 DK NGC Energinet Denmark  
10.3 SE NGA Swedish Energy Agency  
10.4 LV NMIN Ministry of Economics  
     
(11.1) X X X  
(11.2) X X X  
(11.3) X X X  
11.4 PL NMIN Ministry of Infrastructure  
 LT NMIN Ministry of Transport and 
Communications 
 
11.5 LT NMIN Ministry of Transport and 
Communications 
 
     
12.1 TRANS ACA Baltic University Programme  
12.2 TRANS IO Hanseatic Parliament  
12.3 DK NMIN Ministry of Science, Technology and 
Innovation 
 
 LT NMIN Ministry of Education and Science  
 DE NMIN Federal Ministry of Education and 
Research 
 
12.4 DE SNA Hamburg Ministry of General and 
Vocational Education 
In cooperation with 
German foreign office.  
(12.5) X X X  
12.6 LT IO LT Youth Council In cooperation with other 
national youth councils 
12.7 FI SNA Regional Council of Southwest Finland In cooperation with Turku 
Touring 
12.8 DE PC AIDA Cruises  
12.9 PL SNA Voivodeship of Pomorskie  
12.10 DE ACA University of Greifswald  
12.11 TRANS IGO Nordic Dimension Partnership in Public 
Health and Social Well-being 
 
12.12 SE SNA Blekinge County Council  
12.13 DE ACA University of Applied Sciences, 
Flensburg 
 
     
13.1 FI NGA Finnish Border Guard  
13.2 SE NGA Swedish Coast Guard  
13.3 TRANS IGO HELCOM  
13.4 DK NGA Danish Maritime Authority  
13.5 PL ACA Maritime University Of Szczecin  
(13.6) X X X  
(13.7) X X X  
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(14.1) X X X  
14.2 DK NGA Admiral Danish Fleet HQ  
14.3 TRAN IGO Council of Baltic Sea States  
     
15.1 EU EUA EUROPOL  
15.2 FI NGA Finnish Border Guard  
15.3 TRANS IGO Baltic Sea Task Force (on organised 
crime in the Baltic Sea region) 
 
15.4 FI NGA National Police Board Finland  
15.5 LT NMIN Ministry of the Interior Public Safety  
The flag ship projects (FP) put within parenthesis, and where country and actor type is marked X, represent those 
FPs where the flagship project leader (FPL) could not be identified. These FPLs are not included in the empirical 
analysis.  Abbreviations ‘Country’: Estonia (EE), Denmark (DK), Finland (FI), Latvia (LV), Lithuania (LT), 
Poland (PL), Sweden (SE) European Union (EU), Transnational (TRANS). Abbreviations ‘Type’: Academia 
(ACA), European Union Institution/Agency (EUA), Intergovernmental Organisation (IGO), Interest 
Organisation (IO), National Government Agency (NGA), National Government Company (NGC), National 
Government Research Institute (NGRI), National Ministry (NMIN), Private Company (PC), Research Institute 
(RI).    
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Appendix 3 
Resources  
 Financial Employees Rep. Brussels Expertise Other/comments 
Min. Economic 
Affairs and 
Communication, 
Estonia 
9 500 000 € 
(2010, 
administrative 
costs) 
242 Through 
permanent 
representation 
of government 
Less clear. 
Competence 
within 
organisation. 
 
VINNOVA, 
Sweden 
32 066 127 € 
(2010) 
210 (average 
2011) 
Yes. Yes. National 
expert role. 
 
Admiral Danish 
Fleet HQ, 
Denmark 
No info. 
Defence 
command (main 
org.): 
2 709 053 752 € 
400 (approx.) Not as it seems. Not clear. 
Competence 
and experience. 
The flagship 
project is based 
on a system 
developed and 
deployed within 
the Danish 
defence. 
HELCOM No information 13 + employees 
on specific 
projects (8, may 
2012) 
Not as it seems. 
Members 
represented 
through 
national perm. 
rep. 
Yes. Expert 
group on the 
issue. 
 
Region 
Blekinge, 
Sweden 
9 592 068 € 
(2010) 
37 701 733 € 
(2012) 
39 (2010) 
57 (2012) 
Yes. Shared 
with 
neighbouring 
region, 2 
employees. 
Not an expert 
organisation, 
but experience 
of other 
projects within 
the issue. 
Increase of 
revenue due to 
new areas of 
responsibility. 
University of 
Greifswald, 
Germany 
No information. 5 846 Not as it seems. Partly. Experts 
within the 
institution for 
geography and 
geology. 
Contact person at 
institute for 
geography and 
geology. 
Agrifood 
Research, 
Finland 
53 800 000 € 
(2010) 
750 (approx.) Not as it seems. Yes.   
Hanseatic 
Parliament 
No information. 8 Not as it seems. Not an expert 
organisation, 
but significant 
relevant 
experience. 
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Position in society 
It is not possible to measure an actor’s position in society on a scale. This overview is a 
discussion concerning e.g. role, function, competence and dominance. Territorial scope and 
number of members is provided in order to put it into the context of the Baltic Sea region. 
 
 Role, function, reputation, 
dominance, competence, etc. 
Territorial coverage/members
1 
Ministry of Economic Affairs and 
Communication, Estonia 
As a ministry it has a central 
position in Estonia and fills an 
important function by developing 
and implementing national 
policies. Not known which 
reputation the Ministry has within 
the Baltic Sea Region. 
Estonia, (1 340 127 inhabitants 
2010). The smallest region in the 
Baltic Sea region. 
VINNOVA, Sweden Government agencies with 
important function in society. 
Especially concerning innovation. 
Provide finance for research and 
for development of innovation 
systems. Counselling to public and 
private actors concerning 
opportunities in the EU. 
Sweden (9 340 682 inhabitants 
2010).  
Admiral Danish Fleet HQ, 
Denmark 
Important for Danish national 
security, as well as for the Baltic 
sea environment. Responsible for 
e.g. “safety at sea including 
combating pollution”. As a military 
authority, it has a certain position 
in society and responsibilities 
concerning national sovereignty, 
international military operations 
etc.   
Denmark (5 534 738 inhabitants 
2010). 
HELCOM One of the most important 
organisations regarding Baltic Sea 
environmental cooperation. Clearly 
a dominant organisation. 
All EUSBSR member states, plus 
Russia and the EU. 
Region Blekinge, Sweden Could not be classified as a strong 
region, but has competences within 
a number of important policy areas 
in society, e.g. regional 
development, growth. Its 
competences have gradually been 
extended to include public 
transportation and environmental 
issues. The limits for cooperation 
are set by the members as well as 
the government.  
Members from 1 County and 5 
municipalities. Covering a 
population of 152 979 inhabitants. 
University of Greifswald, Germany Does not seem to be the largest 
university in Germany, but it is one 
of the oldest, founded in 1456. It is 
ranked 401-500 in the world and 
33-39 nationally, according to 
Shanghai ranking. However, its 
reputation regarding the specific 
issue is unknown.   
12 452 students. 
1Member states’ population: Eurostat (2012) Total Population, available at: 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/eurostat/home/, accessed 2012-05.05.  
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Access to information and channels of influence 
  
 Network/cooperation in Baltic 
Sea region 
Representation in Brussels 
Min. Economic Affairs and 
Communication, Estonia 
Does not mention Baltic 
cooperation specifically.  
Estonia’s permanent 
representation. The ministry has 5 
counsellors. Represents itself at 
Transport, Telecommunication and 
Energy Council, and 
Competitiveness Council.  
VINNOVA, Sweden Highly involved in EU and 
international cooperation. No 
information concerning Baltic Sea 
Region cooperation in specific, 
other than the EUSBSR project. 
Yes. They have an informative 
function for other actors 
concerning EU policies on the 
issue. 
Admiral Danish Fleet HQ, 
Denmark 
Not that is specified. Not as it seems. 
HELCOM Is a Baltic sea region cooperation 
itself. Is rather a source for 
influence and information for other 
actors. Cooperate with stakeholders 
in the Baltic Sea region. 
Not as it seems. The member states 
are represented nationally through 
permanent representation. The EU 
is a member of the organisation. 
Region Blekinge, Sweden Yes. Participant in at least 3 Baltic 
Sea region forums for cooperation. 
Yes.  
University of Greifswald, Germany Seem to have many contacts in the 
region. Regarding international 
partnerships, one of the 
cooperation networks concern 
bilateral agreements with Baltic 
and Nordic Universities. It is 
however, less clear if its 
cooperation in the Baltic region 
includes participation in formalised 
organisations or networks.  
Not as it seems. 
Agrifood Research, Finland Participates in the Baltic Stern 
Network founded in 2009, for 
Baltic Sea research. It emphasise 
involvement in international and 
EU cooperation, but does not 
mention Baltic Sea region in 
specific. 
Not as it seems. 
Hanseatic Parliament Is a Baltic Sea region network and 
forum for cooperation itself. Is a 
member of and in close 
cooperation with the Baltic Sea 
Academy.  
Not as it seems. 
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Affectedness 
Affectedness is measured by an actor’s explicit interest in Baltic Sea cooperation or in the 
issue of the Priority Area, as well as by the correspondence between the actor’s area of 
competence and the issue of the Priority Area.  
Min. Economic Affairs 
and Communication 
(MKM), Estonia 
 
Priority Area 6: to remove 
hindrances to the internal 
market in the Baltic Sea 
region including to 
improve cooperation in 
the customs and tax area 
Baltic Sea Region Cooperation: No explicit interest in Baltic sea cooperation.  It 
promotes the Baltic Sea region as an advantage for Estonia. 
 
Issue of the Priority Area: The ministry has competences within, e.g., trade, 
industry, transport, telecommunication, and standardisation. Thus, the issue is of 
relevance for the ministry. Tax related issues belong to the ministry of finance. 
 
According to the ministry’s Council positions, there is an explicit interest to 
achieve “a single market with as small differences as possible ” and “support as 
extensively as possible harmonization of indirect taxes and abolition of exceptions 
as well as productive cross-border cooperation”1 
 
Other/Comments: Estonia is Priority Area Coordinator, and the ministry of 
Economic Affairs and Communication seems to be the responsible ministry. 
VINNOVA, Sweden  
 
Priority Area 7: to exploit 
the full potential of the 
region in research and 
innovation 
Baltic Sea Region Cooperation: There is no specific interest expressed for 
cooperation in the Baltic Sea region, even if there is a clear general interest for 
cooperation in the EU. 
 
Issue of the Priority Area: there is a strong interest for innovation, given that it is 
the Swedish governmental innovation agency. Its aim is to “increase the 
competitiveness of Swedish researchers and companies”2 
 
To develop innovation systems, in Sweden, is within its field of competence.  
 
Other/Comments: VINNOVA has been instructed by the government to take part 
in the implementation of the EUSBSR and to lead the flagship project, and is 
thereby strongly affected by the EUSBSR.  
Furthermore, VINNOVA and the Swedish Ministry of Enterprise, Energy and  
Communications are coordinators for the Priority Area together with Poland.  
Admiral Danish Fleet HQ, 
Denmark  
 
Priority Area 14: to 
reinforce protection from 
major emergences at sea 
and on land 
Baltic Sea Region Cooperation: Not clear, but no interest expressed in 
cooperation in the Baltic Sea Region in specific.  
 
Issue of the Priority Area:  the Admiral Danish Fleet HQ has the contingency 
function for “combating pollution of the sea caused by oil and other harmful 
substances”3 in Denmark. 
 
Maritime Assistance Centre, Joint Rescue Coordination Centre and maritime 
environment are activities located within the organisations Operation Centre. 
HELCOM  
 
Priority Area 3: to reduce 
the use and impact of 
hazardous substances 
Baltic Sea Region Cooperation: Cooperation in the Baltic Sea is of strong 
interest, since it is HELCOM is a Baltic Sea Region cooperation. 
 
Issue of the Priority Area:  The issue is one of the priorities, and objective 
concerning hazardous substances was adopted already in 1998. 
 
Other/Comments: the activity of HELCOM is, according to the EUSBR Action 
plan, important for the implementation of the first pillar which PA 3 belongs to. 
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Region Blekinge, Sweden  
 
Priority Area 4: to become 
a model region for clean 
shipping 
Baltic Sea Region Cooperation: Explicitly express an interest for the Baltic Sea 
Strategy, by referring to geographical location and availability to funding. The 
region has developed its own action plan for implementing the EUSBSR. Hence, it 
seems as if there is a strong interest for cooperation in the Baltic Sea region.  
 
Issue of the Priority Area:  According to the regional development programme, 
there maritime safety is of interest for the region due to competence within the 
region and the environmental competences of an accident at sea. 
 
Environmental issues have only been a part of Region Blekinge’s activities since 
2011.  
  
University of Greifswald, 
Germany 
 
within Priority Area 12: to 
maintain and reinforce 
attractiveness of the Baltic 
Sea region in particular 
through tourism 
Baltic Sea Region Cooperation: Less clear. However, culture of the Baltic region 
is one of it six research focuses. It has an interest in Baltic cooperation as a subject. 
Also have international agreements with universities within the Baltic sea Region. 
The Baltic Sea region is a geographical focus for some of the research at the 
university. 
 
Issue of the Priority Area: tourism is an issue of interest for the institute of 
geology and geography. Social and economic geography, which is a subject within 
the institute for geology and geography, has tourism as its working field.  
  
Other/Comments: The working field of social and economic geography has 
tourism as a thematic focus, and Baltic Region as a geographical focus. The 
combination of those focuses makes the institution of geology and geography 
particularly affected. Mecklenburg-Vorpommern is priority area coordinator. 
Agrifood Research, 
Finland  
 
Priority Area 9: to 
reinforce sustainability of 
agriculture, forestry and 
fishing 
Baltic Sea Region Cooperation: There is no explicit interest regarding 
cooperation in the Baltic Sea region specifically.  
 
Issue of the Priority Area:  There is a great interest for agriculture, as well as 
sustainability. Fishing and forestry does not seem to be within institute’s interest, 
but might to some extent be related to its focus on rural enterprise and food 
production.  
 
Since the institute is conducting research concerning agriculture and sustainability, 
the issue is relevant. It has a research programme Research programme concerning 
water friendly agriculture aiming at the wellbeing of the Baltic Sea has been 
conducted since before the EUBSR.  
 
Hanseatic Parliament  
 
within Priority Area 12: to 
maintain and reinforce 
attractiveness of the Baltic 
Sea region in particular 
through education 
Baltic Sea Region Cooperation: Strong interest in Baltic Sea region cooperation 
since the organisation is a Baltic Sea region cooperation. Promotion of cooperation 
is part of its objective. Does, e.g., support a web forum for SME’s interested in 
Baltic cooperation. 
 
 Issue of the Priority Area:  The main goal of the organisation is to” improve the 
situation of SME’s in the Baltic Sea area”4. Assisting with education is one of the 
means for achieving that goal. Education is one area which the organisation is 
active in. 
 
 
1. Ministry of Economic Affairs and Communications, Estonia, Estonia’s Positions and Priorities, 
http://www.mkm.ee/eu/, accessed 29-04-2012 
2. VINNOVA, About VINNOVA, http://www.vinnova.se/en/About-VINNOVA/, accessed 06-05-2012 
3. Admiral Danish Fleet, Maritime Environment, 
http://forsvaret.dk/SOK/ENG/NATIONAL/ENVIRONMENT/Pages/default.aspx, accessed 06-05-
2012. 
4. Hanseatic Parliament, Objectives of the Hanseatic Parliament, http://www.hanse-
parlament.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=18&Itemid=27, accessed 06-05-2012. 
 
